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1 ITRODUCTIO 
 
 
 
In democratic systems, the presence of political opposition and its 
internalization, especially by the political authorities, is a significant factor for its 
sustainability. In this respect, the following research attempts to examine the Turkish 
governments’ attitudes toward opposition parties in Turkish politics after the country’s 
transition to multi-party politics in 1946. Three different time periods and two different 
types of governments are selected for comparison. The aim of this research is to 
understand the nature of the perception of the political opposition in the eyes of the 
governing elites in Turkey. 
 
1.1  Questions and Expectations 
 
     As will be discussed in the following pages in detail, political opposition is 
recognized as one of the indispensable features of democracy. The absence or presence 
of the multi-party system (thus the political opposition) is one of the indicators of a  
democratic regime. As Apter claims, competing parties can make each of the spheres of 
a democratic system active and meaningful, or they can dull the system and make it 
inoperative.1 Türsan, agreeing with Apter, claims that by themselves parties are not 
guaranty of democracy, however, they can create the conditions and interact in ways 
that make democracy possible, therefore political parties are a necessary, albeit 
insufficient condition of democracy.2 The literature on democracy and political 
                                                 
1 Apter, D. E. (1962). “Some Reflections on the Role of a Political Opposition in New 
Nations,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 4(2), p. 161 
 
2Türsan, H. (2004). Democratisation in Turkey. Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, p. 263 
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opposition, which will be discussed in the second chapter, presents that there is a 
positive correlation between the presence of political opposition and the development of 
democracy. Depending on this suggestion, Turkish politics contains several questions 
and expectations related to the relationship between development of political opposition 
and democratization of the country. 
 
     First of all, at least structurally, Turkey moved to multi-party politics when the 
opposition parties started to be established in 1945. In 1946, national elections were 
conducted with the participation of opposition parties. In 1950, the government changed 
democratically for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic. Since then 
Turkey has been experiencing democratic multi-party politics except for the 
breakdowns with military interventions in 1960, 1971, and 1980.  
 
     The arising question is, whether Turkish politics had achieved the recognition 
and internalization of the opposition parties into the political system after experiencing 
multi-party politics for a long time or not. Comparing the early and contemporary 
Turkish politics, the attitudes of the governments toward the opposition parties 
constitute one of the sources to understand how the government elites view their 
opponents.  
 
     Regarding the question above, two experiences of party governments of the 
Turkish Republic are selected for comparison. The governments of the Democratic 
Party (DP) and Justice and Development Party (AKP) are party governments, which 
enjoyed substantial majorities in the National Assembly. The DP represents the 
beginning of the multi-party politics and the AKP represents the contemporary situation 
of Turkish politics. Thus, the elites of these two party governments are selected for 
analysis of their attitudes toward the opposition parties. It is hypothesized here that the 
length of experience of multi-party politics contributes to the recognition and 
internalization of political opposition in the eyes of the governing elites.  
 
     In addition, this research provides a comparison of party governments with 
coalition governments. Coalition governments also ruled the country for several years 
and the question here is whether there is a difference between the attitudes of the elites 
of the party governments and of the coalition governments toward opposition parties. It 
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hypothesized here that since coalition governments do not have large majorities in the 
National Assembly and they need as much support from every parliamentary party as 
they can get, and thus they are expected to have less negative and conflictual behavior 
toward the opposition parties than party governments.  
 
     Regarding all of the questions and expected outcomes, this research aims to 
provide a picture on the attitudes of governing party elites toward opposition parties 
comparing different types of governments and different time periods. 
 
1.2  The Significance of the Research 
 
     The analysis of the attitudes of the governments toward political opposition is 
significant for several reasons. First of all, although the presence and recognition of the 
opposition is very significant for the evaluation of the political system, the topic has not 
been studied extensively. Pointing to this gap, Helms recently claimed that “although 
published as early as in the mid-1960s, Robert Dahl’s Political Oppositions in Western 
Democracies remains the unchallenged point of reference in a field that has seen few 
substantial contributions since.”3 Two years later, Mujica and Sanchez argued the same 
point that “although the analysis of opposition has a long tradition dating back to the 
mid twentieth century, if not before, many scholars have complained that Robert Dahl’s 
first systematic treatment of the subject has not been matched by comparable 
subsequent studies and that, as a result, opposition remains an inadequately explored 
area of political science.”4 As a result, although significant studies on this topic exist, 
and some will be discussed in the second chapter, the authors of these studies also claim 
that the amount of research related to this topic remains less than the importance of the 
topic requires.  
 
     The same gap is also present in the literature on Turkish politics. There are some 
significant studies which will be discussed in the second chapter, but as Komsuoğlu 
                                                 
3 Helms, L. (2004). “Five Ways of Institutionalizing Political Opposition: Lessons from 
the Advanced Democracies,” Government and Opposition, 39(1), p. 23  
 
4 Mujica, A. and Sanchez, I. (2006). “Consensus and Parliamentary Opposition: The 
Case of Spain,” Government and Opposition, 41(1),  p. 86 
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claims the only study that she could access, which directly focuses on the political 
opposition in the literature of Turkish politics is the book of Nükhet Turgut.5 Even the 
comprehensive research of Turgut6 examines only the time period from the 1950s until 
the 1980s but fails to cover the contemporary Turkish politics. Similarly, the work of 
Komsuoğlu, which is quoted above, includes other research on the political opposition 
in Turkey but covers the period of multi-party politics only until the 1980s. This thesis 
not only covers the 1950s, the beginning of the multi-party politics, but also the 1990s 
and the 2000s.  
 
     Beyond its contribution to the shortage in the literature on political opposition in 
Turkish politics, this study also tries to provide insight into the development of 
democratic culture in Turkey. As discussed above, the correlation between status of the 
political opposition and the level of democratic consolidation is highly emphasized in 
the literature. So, a study focusing on the attitudes of the Turkish political authorities 
toward opposition parties in the multi-party period will be conducive to a better 
understanding of the Turkish democratization process.  
 
     Finally, this study aims not only to contribute to the literature on political 
science, but also to the literature on conflict analysis and resolution. The relation 
between government and opposition parties is one of the significant and most 
conflictual fields of politics. Besides, this relation should not be taken only as political. 
Since political parties are the most influential actors of political life, the interactions and 
conflicts between them have the potential of affecting the different dynamics of the 
society and the country. This research aims to provide an overtime perspective on how 
governments react toward the opposition parties in the past and today. In this way, 
whether the relation between these two actors evolved toward a more or less 
competitive one, whether more integrative or more exclusive exercises are dominant 
toward the opposition parties, whether more positive or negative attitudes had been 
developed toward the opposition parties will be analyzed in this thesis.  
                                                 
5 Komsuoğlu, A. (2008). Türkiye’de Siyasal Muhalefet [Political Opposition in Turkey]. 
Đstanbul: Bengi Yayınları, p. 11 
 
6 Turgut, N. (1984). Siyasal Muhalefet [Political Opposition]. Ankara: Birey ve Toplum 
Yayınları. 
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1.3  The Outline of the Research 
 
     The next chapter, Chapter 2, provides the definition of political opposition in the 
context of this research. It also includes theoretical discussions on political opposition 
related to democracy and conflict resolution. Finally, it describes the development of 
political opposition in Turkey and theoretical perspectives on its development. 
 
     Chapter 3 deals with methodology. The research questions and the hypotheses 
are presented in this chapter. The units of analysis, the periods and the governments that 
are included in the study, formation of the sample, collection and analysis of the data 
and the methodology which is used for the interpretation of the data are all explained in 
this chapter as well. Finally, the operational procedures used for the coding of the data 
and the inter-coder reliability test, which is very significant for the reliability and 
reproducibility of the research, are present in this chapter. 
 
     Chapter 4 contains the findings of this study organized into tables and graphs. 
Findings regarding each question presented in Chapter 3 and their interpretations are 
also presented in this chapter.  
 
     The final chapter, Chapter 5, presents the discussions regarding all of the 
findings and presents the broad picture which appeared after the research. This final 
chapter also includes the limitations of the research and the suggestions for future 
research on the same topic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  POLITICAL OPPOSITIO: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
     In this chapter, firstly, opposition and political opposition will be theoretically 
examined to introduce what is considered as political opposition in this research. Then 
the discussions about the interdependency between democracy and political opposition 
will be analyzed to better understand the role of multi-party politics for a democratic 
system. The effect of the nature of the relation between governing and opposition 
parties on the development of political conflicts will be discussed to better establish the 
relevance of the topic with the conflict resolution field. Finally, the historical 
development of the political opposition in Turkish politics and the problems that it has 
encountered will be discussed to understand the background of the political opposition 
in Turkish politics. 
 
2.1  Political Opposition 
 
 “The right of opposition, it seems to me, is a natural, inalienable, and sacred right.”7 
                                                                                                          Diderot 
 
     The word ‘opposition’ has several definitions. For instance, the official 
dictionary of Turkish language, presented by Turkish Language Association (TDK), 
puts three different definitions. One of the definitions, the broadest one, presents the 
opposition as a state of being against an attitude, an opinion or a behavior.8 In this 
                                                 
7 Qtd in Ionescu, G. and Madariaga, I. (1972). Opposition: Past and Present of a 
Political Institution. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, p. 29 
 
8
http://tdk.gov.tr/TR/Genel/SozBul.aspx?F6E10F8892433CFFAAF6AA849816B2EF4376734BED947C
DE&Kelime=muhalefet 
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sense, opposition is always present as a natural and inevitable feature of human kind in 
every type of relation and in every aspect of life. From micro levels to macro levels of 
relations between states, religions, social classes or genders, contending ideas, 
cleavages and presence of opposition have been inevitable and natural.  
 
     In politics as well, political opposition is a natural, inevitable and a necessary 
feature. In a broader sense political opposition is defined as a behavior or an action that 
constitutes being against a political regime and its socio-economic condition or only one 
of them, criticizing them with or without proposing an alternative system or using legal 
or illegal methods.9 Thus, any kind of opposition toward any political subject regardless 
of the organization or the structure of the opposition is defined as political opposition.  
 
     The definition above presents a very broad formulation of political opposition. 
In this study, however, political opposition is defined in a much narrower sense. What is 
meant by political opposition is only the parliamentary opposition since as Helms 
claims, parliamentary opposition is considered to be the true form of political opposition 
in Western democracies.10 Parliamentary opposition is preferred for this study since as 
Giulj claims it has two functions, which are the institutionalization of the conflicts 
inherent in every society and the institutionalization of contestation by transforming it 
into a parliamentary opposition which ensures the dynamism and the duration of 
democratic systems.11 The intention, by focusing on parliamentary opposition, is to 
observe legitimate and institutional way of political opposition. However, what is meant 
by the parliament is not the place itself. The parliamentary opposition is considered to 
be the opposition of any legal political party regardless of its representation in the 
National Assembly.12 More specifically, TDK’s other definition of opposition, which 
says that political opposition is the party or parties that are out of the government in a 
                                                 
9 Turgut, N. (1984). op. cit., p. 8 
  
10 Helms, L. (2004). op. cit., p. 24 
 
11 Giulj, S. (1981). “Confrontation or Conciliation: The Status of the Opposition in 
Europe,” Government and Opposition, 16(4), p. 494 
 
12 Turgut, N. (1984). op. cit., p. 14 
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democratic system, is the definition of political opposition in this research.13 Thus, for 
this research, political opposition means any legal political party which is not in the 
government.  
 
2.2 Political Opposition and Democratic System 
 
“If there be no opposition, there is no democracy…”14 
                                                     Sir Ivor Jennings 
 
     The above sentence belongs to Sir Ivor Jennings who refers to the roots of 
institutionalized political opposition developing firstly in British politics. According to 
Jennings, the notion of opposition as an inherent feature of the political system is more 
sharply defined in Britain than in anywhere else, and this has been for a far longer 
time.15 The idea of opposition was introduced to British politics back in the 18th century. 
In the early 19th century opposition parties participated in the elections for the first time 
and political opposition institutionalized since then. Jennings claim that “although only 
the Great Britain has genuinely given the opposition the status of an institution and 
recognized its rights and responsibilities, other countries have given it a measure of 
recognition by introducing into positive law the notion of parliamentary minority 
entitled to some prerogatives.”16 
 
    Although the broadest definition of opposition, as given above, says that the 
political opposition is inevitable and present in every political system, it is not 
recognized as a legal actor in political systems other than democracies. Przeworski and 
Limongi define democracy as a regime in which some governmental offices are filled as 
                                                 
13http://tdk.gov.tr/TR/Genel/SozBul.aspx?F6E10F8892433CFFAAF6AA849816B2EF4
376734BED947CDE&Kelime=muhalefet 
 
14  Jennings, I. (1961). Cabinet Government, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
p. 16 
 
15 Johnson, N. (1964). “Opposition in the British Political System,” Government and 
Opposition, 32(4), p. 487 
 
16 Giulj, S. (1981). op. cit., p. 477 
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a consequence of contested elections.17 This contestation occurs only when there exists 
an opposition that has some chance of winning office as a consequence of elections and 
only in those systems incumbent parties actually did lose the offices.18 Also, Beyme and 
Daniels claim that in most of the authoritarian systems, opposition parties were totally 
forbidden or it was existent only for show where they do not have a chance of winning 
the offices.19 
 
Helms claims that it has long been acknowledged by democratic theory that the 
principle of legitimate political opposition belongs to the most fundamental components 
of any liberal democracy.20 From the same perspective, R. Dahl claims that the rights to 
oppose and dissent the views of the governments are what distinguish libertarian from 
authoritarian systems.21 The same point is emphasized by Ionescu and Madariaga as the 
presence or absence of institutionalized opposition which can become the criterion for 
the classification of any political society into one of two categories: liberal or 
dictatorial, democratic or authoritarian, pluralistic-constitutional, or monolithic.22 Linz 
and Stepan are the others who distinguish democratic systems from authoritarian or 
totalitarian systems depending on the presence of political opposition. They claim that 
democratic systems require open contestation over the right to win control of the 
government, and this in turn requires free competitive elections, the result of which 
                                                 
17
 Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F. (1997). Democracy and Development in Hadenius, A. 
(Eds.). Democracy’s Victory and Crisis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
p. 179 
 
18 Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F. (1997). op. cit., p. 179 
 
19 Beyme, K. and Daniels, D. (2004). “Opposition” (Mehmet Turhan, Trans.). Ankara 
Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, 36(1), p. 220 (original work published in 1973). 
 
20 Helms, L. (2004). op. cit., p. 22 
 
21 Dahl, R.A. (1965). “Reflections on Opposition in Western Democracies,” 
Government and Opposition, 1(1), p. 7  
 
22 Ionescu,G. and Madariaga,I. (1972). op. cit., p. 16 
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determine who governs.23 Linz and Stepan put political parties and elections as essential 
features of a democratic system.24  
 
In fact, what is meant by democracy is not clear all the time. In other words, the 
definition, essentials and contents of democracy vary across scholars and politicians. 
Despite this plethora of definitions of democracy, the ideas on the relationship between 
political opposition and democracy do not vary at all. For instance, Lipset argues that 
“democracy implies a number of specific conditions: (1) a ‘political formula’ or body of 
beliefs specifying which institutions – political parties, a free press, and so forth – are 
legitimate (accepted as proper by all) (2) one set of political leaders in office and (3) 
one or more sets of recognized leaders attempting to gain office.”25 For this study, the 
most significant point in the definition of Lipset is the need for recognized political 
parties and leaders attempting to gain the control of the government office or, in other 
words, the essentiality of political competition for democracy.  
 
     The same case is also pointed by Diamond when he defines democracy as a 
system of institutionalized competition for power. According to him, without 
competition there is no democracy.26 Similarly, Giulj claims that “the greatest common 
denominator of the Western democracies is undoubtedly the recognition of the 
opposition which has been integrated within the institutional and especially the 
parliamentary machinery.”27 The author continues that the ways in which the opposition 
is integrated into the political system vary (confrontation or conciliation) and it seems 
that the appropriateness of one or another way depends on the extent of alternation in 
                                                 
23 Linz, J. J. and Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 3 
 
24 Ibid., p. 8 
 
25 Lipset, S. M. (1959). Political Man. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, p. 45 
 
26 Diamond, L. (1990). “Three Paradoxes of Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, 1(3), 
p. 49 
 
27 Giulj, S. (1981). op. cit., p. 472 
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power and consensus of the system. In any event, the exclusion of the opposition is 
incompatible with the smooth working of democracy because it is its presence which 
gives meaning to the parliamentary institution.28 Giulj concludes that “the criterion by 
which one can judge if a democracy is functioning properly is the presence of a genuine 
opposition within the parliamentary system.”29 Close also remarks on this point that “in 
an ideal democracy opposition is encouraged, because it makes governments defend 
their decisions, assures the ventilation of opinions, and fosters debate.”30  
 
     Presenting many other interpretations about the importance of the opposition for 
a democratic system is possible. Also, presenting many other definition of political 
opposition is possible. The political opposition can be a parliamentary or extra-
parliamentary opposition, or can be party or interest group opposition. An assertion that 
the political opposition is the only denominator for the establishment of democracy 
would be an oversimplification. However, simply, in the literature on democracy, the 
scholars above agree on that political opposition is one of the indispensable components 
of a democratic system.  
  
2.3  Political Opposition and Conflict 
 
     For a democratic system, the presence and recognition of political opposition is 
important regarding the development of political conflicts. Blondel claims that if the 
distance between the goals of the main opposition body and those of the government is 
small, the temperature of political conflicts likely to be low; if that distance is large, the 
temperature of political conflict is likely to be high.31 The tension between these two 
political actors is significant since it influences the outcomes of the conflict. As an 
                                                 
28 Giulj, S. (1981). op. cit., p. 485 
 
29 Ibid., p. 493 
 
30 Close, D. (2000). “Democratization and Opposition,” Unpublished paper presented at 
the XXII International Congress of LASA, p. 1 
 
31 Blondel, J. (2007). “Political Opposition in the Contemporary World,” Government 
and Opposition, 32(4), p. 470 
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example, regarding the government of DP, Cleveland claims that “by removing the 
outlets for peaceful criticism, the government created a situation in which violent 
protest became the only means of expressing political opposition.”32 Then, any political 
conflict has the potential of escalation rather than a proclivity for peaceful solutions. In 
this regard, a study on government-opposition relations stands to be important for the 
conflict studies as well since the governing and opposition parties are the actors which 
mostly determine the outcomes of the conflicts. 
 
     In fact, conflicts between governments and opposition parties are normal and not 
necessarily bad. Such scholars of political science as Dahl, Lipset, Lane and Ersson 
emphasize the necessity of conflicts and cleavages as well as the necessity of consensus 
in a society for a democratic system. For instance, Dahl’s arguments on the low and 
high consensus systems are significant. On the one hand, he claims, high-consensus 
polities are prone to ignore possible advantages of radical changes in the status quo 
since the alternatives presented by political leaders for consideration among themselves 
and by the voters are likely to represent relatively small marginal changes.33 On the 
other hand, low-consensus polities may find it difficult to profit from the advantages of 
incremental changes since the greater discrepancy between the goals of the parties to a 
conflict give way to coercion and bargaining rather than problem-solving and 
persuasion.34 Accordingly, developing a balance between a conflictual and consensual 
society, which north European democracies have come close to demonstrate such a 
balance, is important. 
 
Continuing with the discussion, referring to the Lipset’s Political Man’s opening 
passage, which states that “the study of the conditions encouraging democracy must 
therefore focus on the sources of both cleavage and consensus”35, J. Lane and S. Ersson 
                                                 
32 Cleveland, W. L. (2000). A History of the Modern Middle East. Boulder: Westview 
Press, pp. 271-272 
 
33 Dahl, R. A. (1965). op. cit., p. 13 
 
34 Ibid., p. 13 
 
35 Lipset, S. M. (1959). op. cit., p. 21 
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claim that Lipset’s starting point for a democratic system is the recognition of the 
presence and necessity of opposition and thus cleavages in the society.36 However, 
Lipset also recognizes the possibility of conflicts or cleavages straining the democratic 
regime so he proposes several factors that are conducive to democratic stability, which 
one of them is the development of conflict resolution.37 Concerning the present study 
here, Lipset’s point shows that the development of conflict resolution methods between 
governing and opposition parties is significant for the sustainability of the political 
system. For a constructive conflict resolution process the relation between government 
and opposition parties is significant. If the relation between these actors is not totally 
exclusive and negative then it is more likely to expect constructive outcomes for the 
conflicts among themselves. This study intends to provide a picture of the relation 
between governments and opposition parties and thus an interpretation about the 
possibility of developing conflict resolution methods. 
 
     As expressed before, this study focuses on the attitudes of the prime ministers’ 
toward the opposition parties. In a sense, this study narrows down its limits to the top 
political elite depending on the idea that political elite is one of the influential actors for 
the constructive conflict resolution processes. Similarly, Lehmbruch, Ursprung and 
Lijphart discuss the importance of political elite in political conflicts as well. In 
concordant democracy, Gerhard Lehmbruch denotes a strategy of conflict management 
by cooperation and agreement among the different elites rather than by competition and 
majority decision.38 Also, Ursprung claims that in concordant democracies the most 
common feature of the political resolution of conflicts in a parliament is not majority 
decision but, far more, the negotiation of sustainable compromises.39 In consociational 
democracy, Lijphart claims that consensual behavior among political elites with 
                                                 
36 Lane, J. E. and Ersson, S. O. (1994). Politics and Society in Western Europe.  
London: Sage Publications. p. 19 
 
37 Ibid., p. 20 
 
38 Ibid., p. 35 
 
39 Ursprung, H. W. (1980). “Voting Behaviour in a system of Concordant Democracy,” 
Public Choice, 35(3), p. 350 
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appropriate institutional support could ensure the effective governance of societies that 
were divided on religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial or ethnic 
lines.40  Although his emphasis is mostly on the role of the institutions for democratic 
stability, he also recognizes that consensus-oriented culture often provides the basis for 
democracy and claims that “consensus democracy” may not be able to take root and 
thrive unless it is supported by a consensual political culture.41 On the same issue, 
Diamond claims that consensus may be best built when opposing party leaders take the 
lead in crafting an understanding and working relationship that bridges historic 
differences, restrains expectations, and establishes longer, more realistic time horizons 
for their agendas.42 Depending on these claims, an observation on the attitudes of the 
Turkish prime ministers toward opposition parties will provide a framework for the 
development of political conflicts in Turkish politics. 
 
    To conclude, the discussions above show that the ability to develop 
consensus, cooperation and compromise is as significant as the presence of opposition, 
cleavage and conflict in the relationship between the governing and opposition parties 
to manage the conflicts for the prosperity of the society. According to previous studies, 
in Western Democracies and more specifically in parliamentary systems, there are 
surprisingly high levels of consensus and cooperation between government and 
opposition compared to other political systems.43 Giuseppe Di Palma shows this pattern 
in Italian politics44, Rose in German and US politics45 and again Rose in British 
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politics.46 Although it is an oversimplification that consensus is absolute in consolidated 
democracies, as Mujica and Sanchez claim, consensus appears exceptional in regimes 
that can not be classified as fully democratic.47 So, this study, by focusing on the 
relation between governments and opposition parties, will provide an aspect on the 
possibility of consensus or dissensus regarding the political conflicts in Turkish politics. 
      
2.4  Political Opposition, Democratic System and Conflict in Turkish Politics 
 
Concerning the discussions above, Turkish political history shows that Turkish 
politicians had problems on developing a consensus or creating a balance between 
consensus and competition. For instance, Uyar claims that in 1909, as the political 
parties emerged, the relations between the political parties transformed to a formation of 
fronts or camps which means high polarization between political parties.48  
 
In particular, political party leaders have part in this bitter polarization. On the 
role of political leaders Swaminathan claims that if the prime ministers decide not to 
negotiate and prefer to repress the opposition then the outcome is conflict and if the 
leaders are risk-acceptant then it is hard to get peaceful resolutions.49 In this regard, 
when the Turkish political leaders are observed, Türsan criticizes the Turkish political 
parties and mostly their leaders since they turned politics into a zero-sum game, 
implemented conflict-seeking strategies, the conflictual situation between disloyal 
opposition and coercive government paved the way for the military interventions and 
brought the emergent democratic regime to several breakdowns and thus they have 
failed in conflict management.50 Similarly, Sunar and Sayarı claim that for Turkey to be 
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successful in her journey of democracy and multi-party system, compromise and 
cooperation should have been achieved among the party leaders.51 However, they seem 
to have failed in respect to the breakdowns and military interventions in the system. The 
non-compromising elite relations and increasing intra-elite conflict, strong party 
fragmentation and polarization made peaceful ends for the political conflicts impossible 
to achieve.52 
 
     In fact, the political actors are expected to ease, handle, and resolve the conflicts, 
but as Helms claims, Turkish political leaders appear unsuccessful on this matter and 
mostly turn Turkish politics into a zero-sum or winner-takes-all situation that may well 
develop into a potential source of conflict in countries with a less tolerant and 
democratically mature political culture.53 Therefore, analyzing both the positions of the 
Turkish governments and also their leaders is significant to develop a framework on the 
development of political conflicts in Turkish politics in the multi-party system. As 
Pierskalla claims, the recognition and internalization of political opposition and 
development of consensus between political actors is one of the factors that help the 
development of democracy which means of less repression of the opposition parties by 
governing parties and thus more constructive results for conflicts.54 
 
2.4.1 History of Political Opposition in Turkish Politics 
 
     Modern Turkish politics takes its roots from a patrimonial monarch of the 
Ottoman Empire. Mardin claims, until 1909, a political opposition did not exist in the 
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Ottoman Empire which checks the absolute power and suggests policy alternatives.55 
Even an independent government which is elected through the votes of the people was 
not present until the beginning of the 20th century in the Ottoman Empire.  Regarding 
the westernization and reformation processes the first opposition party was able to come 
into existence in 1908 with the Fedekaran-i Millet Fırkası.56 Although some other 
opposition parties were present, the government, the Committee of Union and Progress 
(ITC), was mostly dominant and repressive during the short experience of multi-party 
politics in the Ottoman Empire. Eventually, the Party of Union and Progress established 
its dictatorship by proclaiming martial law and refusing to renew the elections.57 Thus, 
until the collapse of the Ottoman system, multi-party politics had been shelved by the 
political power.  
 
     The situation was not much different after the establishment of the Republic. As 
Apter claims, the role of a political opposition has proved ambiguous in most newly 
independent nations and new governments rarely see the necessity for an opposition 
party nor do they always accept the idea of opposition as a normal feature of 
government.58 Although some legal opposition parties were established in the first 
decade of the Republic, Turkish politics, similar to the claims of the Apter, reflects a 
type of authoritarian system or “dominant party system”59 under the governance of a 
single party without accepting the idea of opposition and opposition party until 1945.  
 
     The 1945 is the year of transition to multi-party system in Turkish politics. 
However, before 1945 there had been two attempts for multi-party politics as well. 
                                                 
55 Mardin, Ş. (1966). “Opposition and Control in Turkey,” Government and Opposition, 
1(3), p. 376 
 
56 See: List of Turkish Political Parties. 
(http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/siyasi_partiler.html) 
 
57 Mardin, Ş. (1966). op. cit., p. 377 
 
58 Apter, D.E. (1962). op. cit., p. 154  
 
59 Wjatr, J. J. and Przeworski, A. (1966). “Control Without Opposition,” Government 
and Opposition, 1(2). 
 
 18 
Regarding these attempts, Karaömerlioğlu claims, 1940s is not a transition but a return 
to multi-party politics.60 The first attempt, the Progressive Republican Party (TCF), was 
founded in 1924. However, the party’s activities were considered to be against the 
secular principles of the Republic, and thus, only one year later after its foundation, in 
1925, TCF was closed down by the Independence Courts.  
 
Close points that in cases of protests as a form of opposition two issues emerge 
which are whether a government interprets such actions as political gestures or as 
simple lawlessness and the extent to which protest is classed as disloyal.61 In the 
Turkish case, TCF was exposed to the second alternative and associated with the illegal 
rebellions against fundamentals of the regime and accused of disloyalty.  
 
     The second experience, with the Free Republican Party (SCF) in 1930, was also 
disappointing and unsuccessful since SCF was forced to abolish itself only after three 
months from its foundation. As Blondel claims, in authoritarian polities the government 
can be brutal or mildly repressive and, in the latter case, allow some groups and even 
parties to express a degree of (limited) dissent, only to clamp down if this opposition 
goes beyond what are regarded as ‘acceptable’ bounds.62 Similar with Blondel, Gartner 
and Regan claim that if there were no serious challenges to the status quo, the ruling 
elite would not risk its dominant position by violently repressing the political 
outbursts.63 In the Turkish case, the founding political elite of the Republic was still not 
convinced that the regime was secure and the political opposition was perceived to be 
moving out of the acceptable boundaries and endangering the fundamentals of the 
Republic. Both the experiences of TCF and SF have come to an end regarding the 
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concerns of the founding elite that these parties would damage the fundamentals of the 
Republic. In other words, the regime considered not consolidated enough to have a 
competitive multi-party politics and thus these parties had been terminated. Lipset’s 
argument that toleration of opposition was the hardest thing for a new democracy to 
learn appears to be true regarding the first decades of the Turkish Republic.64 
 
     The third attempt, which actually established the multi-party system in Turkey, 
started in the mid-1940s. On 5 September 1945, the National Development Party65 
(MKP) was established by Nuri Demirağ as the first opposition party in Turkey after the 
World War II.66 However, the real party competition started after the foundation of DP 
on January 7, 1946. DP was born out of CHP, presented a serious opposition and 
acquired the government after the 1950 national elections.  
 
     Transition to multi-party politics starts with 1946 since DP was founded and a 
national election with the participation of the opposition parties took place in 1946. As 
Romano claims, in 1946 Turkey implemented all the procedural requirements to 
transform the state into electoral democratic politics or into procedural democracy.67 
However, the 1946 elections, in which DP acquired 60 members of the 465 
representatives, did not provide equal chance of competition to all of the parties. 
According to Zurcher, “the electoral procedures were far from perfect: there was no 
guarantee of secrecy during the actual voting, there was no impartial supervision of the 
elections and as soon as the results were declared the actual ballots were destroyed, 
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making any checks impossible.”68 That is why the 1950 elections stand as a more 
significant democratic development than the 1946 elections regarding the transition to 
competitive party politics in Turkey. 
 
     The elections in 1950 took place without major incidents and were indeed free 
and fair by all accounts.69 With the 1950 elections DP won the majority of the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly (TBMM) and established its party government which would 
govern the country for a decade.70 So, 1950 stands important since it was the first 
experience of change of governing party and beginning of the new political life in 
Turkey. However, why the Turkish political decided to switch to multi-party politics is 
highly debated. There are four different views on this transition which are discussed 
below. 
 
2.4.2 The Perspectives on the Transition to Multi-Party Politics in Turkish 
Politics 
 
     The first perspective refers to the internal dynamics of the country to explain the 
switch to multi-party system. Especially during and after the World War II, increasing 
numbers of people migrated to cities, acquiring the education, literacy and interests to 
mobilize politically. Romano claims that this dynamic changed the expectation of the 
society, and thus the Republic’s ruling elites decided to vent building political pressure 
by moving to a multi-party electoral system in 1946.71 According to Zurcher, CHP had 
even lost the support of the Young Turk Coalition and thus had to move toward multi-
party system to ease the discontent that is increasing gradually.72 The majority of the 
masses and social groups believed that a new kind of regime is not possible with a 
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single-party system. Neither the majority of the rural nor the urban populations were 
happy with the one-party system. CHP’s public support was still significant but 
decreasing. In this perspective, Karaömerlioğlu claims that the increasing discontent 
from the social dynamics appears as the most proper explanation for the return to multi-
party politics.73 
 
     The second perspective focuses more on the external factors that prodded 
Turkish political leaders toward the multi-party system. After the Second World War, 
Soviet Union declared to Turkey that it would not renew the Friendship Treaty and 
formulated number of new conditions which include correction of the borders and 
change on the regime of the Turkish Straits.74 At the end of the war “Democratic Front” 
appeared as the victor and democratic tendencies started to prevail around the world.75 
The Democratic Front or the West Camp under the leadership of the US started to 
condemn the authoritarian one-party regimes and thus Turkish the political leaders 
chose to introduce a multi-party system to get the political and also economic support of 
the US and the West.76 
 
     The third point of view suggests that the political elite of the country was the 
group who triggered this transformation. According to this approach, the goal of the 
early Republican governments was to make the society attain the level of contemporary 
civilization. Since it was recognized that contemporary civilization was defined by 
Europe, the direction of change was Westernization. The models, such as France and 
Great Britain, were all political democracies. Hence, arriving at contemporary 
civilization did not preclude but actually implied the adoption of a politically 
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competitive system.77 Duverger claims that for the leaders of the Turkish Republic the 
ideal remained a plural system, monopoly being a result of the special political situation 
in Turkey.78 The intra-party opposition in CHP which was recognized early in the 
Republican era was a sign of pluralism accepted by the elite.79 Weiker, also, defines the 
period between 1931 and 1946 as a flexible one-party regime.80  
 
     The final perspective emphasizes the role of Đsmet Đnönü, the president of the 
Republic and the head of the CHP. In fact, Đnönü was making speeches supporting the 
idea of multi-party politics. Early in his presidency, in 1939, an Independent Group was 
founded in CHP to represent the opposition. Although this group did not present a 
significant opposition at all, it was still important since the Independent Group shows 
that the idea of organized opposition was not abandoned while the systems of ‘single 
party, single leader’ are dominant in Europe.81 Then in 1944 and later in 1945 Đnönü 
declared that the only deficiency of Turkish democracy is the absence of opposition 
party. Two years later, in 1947, it was again Đnönü who made the Twelfth of July 
Declaration in which he intended to protect the presence of political opposition.  
 
     Regarding these events, Gunter claims that in 195082 Đsmet Đnönü, Atatürk’s 
successor, ended the one-party rule of the Republican Peoples Party by allowing 
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Turkey’s first genuinely competitive elections.83 Heper also claims that Đnönü wanted to 
develop Turkish democracy, avoided authoritarian policies and stood as a protector of 
democracy and multi-party system.84 Similarly, Kara suggests that the understanding of 
Đnönü brought the multi-party politics to Turkey. According to Kara, although external 
factors represent the basic concerns, the main reason for the transition is the 
understanding of the Đnönü that he had to let multi-party politics to secure the support of 
the West which was not the actual demand of the Western countries for multi-party 
politics.85 
 
     Finally, Angrist recognizes the contributions of the first three perspectives but he 
claims that neither the international context nor the internal features completely explain 
the events. Rather he focuses on the role of political leaders and claims that “if key 
actors conclude that a given party system configuration threatens their core values and 
interests, they are likely to defect from democratic norms which was not the case in 
Turkey so a transition to competitive party system had been successful in Turkey.”86 
 
     All of these different perspectives contribute partially to the explanation of the 
transition to multi-party politics. Since the transition, excluding the breakdowns with 
the military coups, Turkish political system has been a multi-party competitive system, 
at least in theory. However, in practice the relations between governments and 
oppositions and the development of the political opposition had never been so easy. As 
Sayarı claims, the long party tradition in Turkey has two important aspects: The 
orientation of party elites toward political conflict and the elitist style of the official 
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parties which had adverse consequences on the contemporary party system.87 Extreme 
antagonism between government and opposition was a dominant feature of political life 
during the Young Turk era and when a competitive party system emerged nearly four 
decades later, a similar tendency manifested itself and government-opposition relations 
rapidly acquired the characteristics of a zero-sum game.88 This difficulty of 
internalizing the political opposition and developing stable relations between 
governments and opposition parties had been subject for theoretical discussions. 
 
2.4.3 Theoretical Perspectives on the Development of Political Opposition in 
Turkish Politics 
 
     Although Heper claims that DP represents the political elite who place the 
democracy over the Republic,89 according to Eroğul, the period under the DP 
government did not advance the procedural democracy further and democracy remained 
as a practice of voting every four years and nothing more.90 Due to the intensity of 
factional cleavages at both elite and mass levels, the polity was divided into two 
diametrically opposed camps. Sayarı claims that “this non-ideological political bi-
polarity precluded compromise between the two parties even on the most fundamental 
principles of democratic processes, gave rise to bitter government-opposition 
confrontations, and frequently undermined the stability of the regime.”91 The high 
polarization between DP and opposition parties brought a quick end to the multi-party 
politics with the first military intervention of the Republic in 1960. There are two 
different perspectives to explain the political polarization and failure of developing 
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compromise between the political parties in Turkish politics. They can be named as 
cultural approach and structural approach.  
 
2.4.3.1    Political Culture Approach 
 
Political culture, very briefly, is the set of attitudes, beliefs and feelings people 
hold about politics.92 In this approach Frey claims that Turkish political culture, as 
having the legacies of the Ottoman Empire, could not develop an idea of legitimate 
opposition. In the Ottoman Empire state was everything, loyalty to the state was above 
everything and conflict with the state was viewed as the severest turpitude and treason. 
Thus, political opposition was easily defined as resistance to both temporal and spiritual 
authority.93 The most prominent legacy of the Ottoman tradition is the perception of in-
group vs. out-group orientation. In a political world perceived as ‘us against them’ in 
which other actors tend to be seen as ‘either with us or against us’ such offensive and 
defensive ties are essential.94 This makes the development of constructive or, at least, 
not destructive relations between the government and the opposition and the 
development of tolerance really hard. 
 
     First, clarifying the meaning of tolerance is significant to develop the discussion 
further. Sullivian and other scholars define tolerance as a willingness to put up with 
those things that one rejects. Politically, it implies a willingness to permit the expression 
of those ideas or interests that one opposes then a tolerant regime, like a tolerant 
individual or group, is one that allows wide berth to those ideas that challenge its way of 
life.95 More specifically, political tolerance is defined as an opposition to state actions 
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that limit opportunities for citizens, individually or in groups, to compete for political 
power.96 Finally, according to Williams and others tolerance includes accepting the 
other, within the law at least, even if it appears to be dangerous.97 
 
     Regarding these definitions, in the cultural perspective, Mardin and Özbudun 
claim that the antagonism toward the opposition can be explained by a behavioral 
pattern in Turkish politics. Mardin uses the Ottoman tradition to explain the problems 
with the political opposition. Accordingly, in the Ottoman political tradition there was 
only one correct way and thus any kind of opposition becomes needless and dangerous. 
Neither the great tradition nor the little tradition which form the Ottoman tradition 
tolerates political opposition and this fabric draws the borders of the political culture 
from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic. Such a political culture creates 
problems since it can not be integrated into the democratic system that the Republic has 
been trying to establish. Mardin concludes that tolerance has to become a functional 
integer of Turkish society before Turkey can really hope to legitimize the opposition in 
the eyes of the majority of the population and the elite.98 Lawrence supports this point 
as he claims that democracy depends on the adherence of elites to democratic 
procedural norms; a democratic system can survive the intolerant attitudes of the masses 
as long as they are balanced by the tolerant attitudes of the politically active.99 
 
     On the issue of tolerance, Close’s remarks are supporting the points presented by 
Mardin. Close claims that even in long-established constitutional democracies, 
governments do not like opposition. Where there is no history of having to tolerate 
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opponents, suddenly having to suffer criticism, face procedural delays, and even see 
projects fail must be especially hard to take.100 To note that there appears a paradox at 
this point. It is hard to tolerate the opposition for the government, but as long as the 
government keeps suppressing the opposition and trying to terminate it, the government 
makes the opposition more violent and even more intolerable. This leads to further 
escalation of the conflicts between the government and opposition parties. As Blondel 
claims, opposition may well be (or become) more radical and indeed probably more 
violent where it is not overtly tolerated than where it is tolerated.101 According to the 
study of Gartner and Regan, governments’ should respond to extreme types of 
opposition demand with comparatively lower levels of repression to avoid spiral of 
escalation of the conflicts.102 Turkey which appears as a not tolerant democracy seems 
to having problems with the presence of political opposition not only in the beginning 
of multi-party politics but also today and this makes the probability of escalation of the 
conflicts more than consensual solutions.103 
 
     In this cultural perspective, Heper claims that continuity from the Ottoman 
Empire characterizes Turkish political culture. Ottoman political norms persist today, 
affecting numerous aspects of contemporary Turkish politics and the cultural cleavage 
between the little and great traditions of the Ottoman Empire remained in Turkish 
Republic in the form cleavage between political and state elite. The state elite consider 
that some in the political elite place political party or even personal interests above the 
long-term interests of the nation. This separation through cultural lines resulted with the 
zero-sum mode of thinking that was typical of Ottoman politics. The state elite and 
political elite with different interests could not develop consensual ends through 
conflicts.104 Gunter, parallel with Heper, claims that the Turkish political culture had not 
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yet fully been imbued with the concept of the loyal opposition. The 600 year old 
authoritarian heritage of the Ottoman Empire had lasted into the twentieth century. 
When the elections were held, party leaders gave too much priority to narrow, short 
term party goals while inhibiting the idea of legitimate opposition.105 
 
     The cultural perspective has a lot to explain about the problem of political 
opposition in Turkey. However, as Frey figures out, the democratic impulse is another 
feature of the Turkish political culture.106 If there is a democratic impulse in the political 
culture then cultural approach remains insufficient to answer the question that why there 
are significant rises and declines and why there is a great tension between the 
government and opposition. These questions lead to the second perspective which 
claims that it is not only the political culture and lack of tolerance that causes the 
problems but the structure of the Turkish political system.  
 
2.4.3.2    Political Structure Approach 
 
     In this second perspective, Kalaycıoğlu criticizes the cultural approach that such 
a cultural environment suggests the impossibility of a successful performance of multi-
party politics which is not the case in Turkey.107 Regarding the claims on the absence of 
tolerance, Kalaycıoğlu, with his survey, shows that there is no widespread lack of 
tolerance for political opposition and lack of support for multi-party system among the 
national and local elites, nor among the masses in Turkey.108 Thus, rather than a cultural 
perspective, Kalaycıoğlu proposes a structural approach in which high-stake politics, 
zero-sum political competition and lack of common good between the political leaders 
can be used to explain the problems of Turkish politics.109  
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     By the same token, Turan claims that the problems on political opposition in 
Turkish politics do not lie in the cultural dynamics. Turan, like Kalaycıoğlu, claims that 
the extreme value political parties attach to acquiring political power and doing this at 
all costs is the main problem. Having power is vital because the Turkish government is 
heavily centralized that distribution of public funds, goods and services all tie in here. In 
other words, state emerges as the most important and powerful actor in the economy. 
The political and economic centrality of the state in Turkish society allows those in 
government to have access directly and indirectly to an immense amount of resources to 
distribute, from which the supporters of government parties stand to benefit more than 
others. This structure of Turkish politics increases the tendency of political parties to 
fight for power at all costs.110  
 
Political parties represent competing organizations for the conquest of state 
power, and the greater and more pervasive the power of the state, the more will parties 
want to get it and keep it at any price and this is why statism is so toxic to democracy 
since it raises the premium on political power to a degree approaching a zero-sum 
game.111 Thus, Diamond claims that the crises in Turkish democracy does not appear to 
have derived from a lack of elements supportive of a democratic system in the political 
culture but from deliberate policies pursued by political parties and their cadres, who 
felt that there was too much at stake in losing elections.112 
 
2.5  Conclusion 
 
     In this chapter the concept of opposition, in particular, political opposition is 
defined. Then, the interdependence between a democratic system, conflict resolution 
and political opposition has been analyzed. In the last part, the historical development of 
political opposition, possible reasons for the transition to multi-party system and the two 
main perspectives on the problem of political opposition in Turkish politics have been 
discussed. 
                                                 
110 Turan, Đ. (1984). op. cit., p. 110 
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     After these discussions the question arises that although Turkish political elite 
introduced and maintained the idea of political opposition since the 1940s, is there any 
change of the situation of political opposition in Turkish politics since then? According 
to the literature on democracy, political opposition is one the prerequisites for a 
democratic system. However, the more significant point beyond the presence of 
political opposition is the tension between the government and opposition which is 
strongly influential on the development of consensus and constructive outcomes for the 
political conflicts, on the stability of democratic system and social-economic dynamics. 
In this sense, it is important to see if the Turkish political culture and/or structure 
developed more tolerance to the political opposition during the experience of multi-
party politics. Regarding these considerations, this study intends to investigate the 
attitudes of the government elites toward the opposition parties by comparing party 
governments and coalition governments together. In the next chapter, the research 
questions, depending on the discussions presented above, will be introduced and the 
procedure that is used for the analysis will be discussed. 
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3  METHODOLOGY and THEORY 
 
 
 
3.1  Scope of the Study 
 
     This study investigates the nature of government-opposition relations in Turkish 
politics. Within the selected time periods, the nature of this relation will be analyzed 
from the perspective of the governing parties toward political opposition parties. This 
comparative research composes three different time periods and cases in which the 
same type of information is collected across multiple time periods and compared. 
Content analysis has been employed as a methodology to interpret the data collected. 
 
3.2  Research Questions 
 
     Regarding the literature discussed in the previous chapter, political opposition 
appears as one of the essential features of a democratic system. Depending on this 
requisite of democracy, whether the Turkish political system, which has been 
experiencing a competitive multi-party democracy since 1945, has developed the 
recognition and integration of political opposition into the political system and how the 
nature of government-opposition relations is will be questioned. 
 
     In this regard this study includes two main research questions. The first research 
question is: How has the experience of multi-party politics, since the introduction of 
multi-party system, influenced the attitude of the governing elites of the party 
governments toward political opposition in Turkish politics? This question is answered 
with the comparison of party government of the 1950s, DP, with the party government 
of 2000s, AKP. 
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     The independent variable, in this question, is the length of experience of the 
Turkish political system with multi-party politics. The dependent variable is the attitude 
of the governing elites of the party governments toward opposition parties. It is 
expected that, as the length of the experience increases, opposition parties become more 
internalized and accepted by the governments. As the experience of co-existence 
increases, it is expected that governing parties would develop less negative attitudes and 
more consensual relations with the opposition parties. The dependent variable will be 
observed with the comparison of two different time periods which are the DP and AKP 
periods. It is intended to investigate whether the process of democratic multi-party 
politics had affected the attitude of party governments toward oppositions, if it has then, 
in what way. 
 
     H1: As the length of the experience of the multi-party system in the Turkish 
politics increases, the presence of political opposition becomes more recognized and 
internalized by the governing elites. 
 
     The second research question is as follows: Is there any difference between the 
attitudes of coalition governments and party governments toward the opposition? As 
Blondel claims, the more power is concentrated in the government, the more opposition 
is also concentrated in one body and therefore cohesive.113 This concentration and 
cohesiveness, in return, causes more competitive and bitter relations between the 
governments and opposition. As Dahl argues, the concentration of power on the 
executive branch could lead to explosive potentialities and is likely to result in a 
strategy of strict competition, rather than, one assumes, of cooperation.114 Although 
some scholars such as Prins and Sprecher115 suggest the opposite, traditionally scholars 
have posited that single-party majority governments are less constrained than minority 
                                                 
113 Blondel, J. (2007). op. cit., p. 473 
 
114 Dahl, R. A. (1966). Political Opposition in Western Democracies. New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press, p. 351 
 
115 Prins, B. C. and Sprecher, C. (1999). “Institutional Constraints, Political Opposition 
and Inter-State Dispute Escalation,” Journal of Peace Research, v. 36. 
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governments which make them more prone to conflict with the opposition.116 As Maoz 
and Russett argue, coalition governments or minority cabinets are far more constrained 
than are governments controlled by a single party and that, as a result, makes them less 
conflict prone.117 However, on the contrary, Ireland and Gartner claims that it is not 
possible to differentiate between the effects of majority and coalition governments 
toward the opposition.118 These different arguments lead to a comparison of party and 
coalition governments to understand if there is significant difference between these two 
types of governments. In this regard, the coalition governments of the 1990s with the 
party governments of both the 1950s and 2000s are compared in this research.  
 
     The independent variable is the type of government, party governments on the 
one hand and coalition governments on the other. The dependent variable is again the 
attitude of government toward opposition parties.  
 
 H2: Governing elites of the coalition governments are more tolerant and 
cooperative toward the political opposition than the governing elites of the party 
governments. 
    
3.3  Unit of Analysis 
 
     The attitude of governing parties towards the opposition parties is the focal point 
of this research. Thus, what is meant by attitude should be clear first. Attitude is a 
concept widely used in social sciences to indicate a relationship between an individual 
and a socially significant object.119 Regarding the studies on the concept of attitude, 
there are two basic frameworks that are used in conceptualization. The framework 
                                                 
116 Ireland, M. J. and Gartner, S. S. (2001). “Government Type and Conflict Initiation in 
Parliamentary Systems,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(5), p. 552 
 
117 Maoz, Z. and Russett, B. (1993). “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic 
Peace, 1946-1986,” The American Political Science Review, 87(3), p. 626 
 
118 Ireland, M. J. and Gartner, S. S. (2001). op. cit.,  p. 563 
 
119 DeFleur, M. L. and Westie, F. R.(1963). “Attitude as a Social Concept,” Social 
Forces, 42(1), p. 19 
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which focuses on the latent processes, inner mechanisms and variables to determine and 
analyze the attitude is not preferred in this study since it becomes complex and 
awkward to measure the concept as DeFleur and Westie suggest.120 Inner mechanisms 
of the individuals or the latent processes are subjective dynamics and measuring them 
can be the interest of psychologists. However, this study analyzes prime ministers’ 
speeches and it is not possible to grasp the inner mechanisms of those with the 
methodology of this research. 
 
    The behavioral probability conception, which is preferred in this study, ignores 
the latent or inner processes but focuses on the more observable manifest messages or 
responses from an individual to the subject. This definition of attitude implies that there 
are definable sets of behavior which an individual can perform as responses towards the 
stimulus in question, that there is a determinable probability of such responses occurring 
in the behavior which the given individual shows in connection with the attitude 
object.121 Regarding this definition, in this study, the responses (verbal expressions-
speeches) of the individual (the prime minister) towards the stimulus (the opposition 
parties) are analyzed to figure out the attitude of the governments toward opposition 
parties in Turkish politics.  
 
     In the relation between government and opposition parties, this research only 
observes the attitudes of the governments since as Pierskalla found, the incidents of 
compromise, deterrence or escalation to violence, that he studies, are actually products 
of the optimal choices of the government.122 Also, prime ministers’ attitudes are 
selected to analyze the attitudes of the governments since as Heper claims, even during 
the multi-party period after 1945, political party leaders continued to have inordinate 
power and thus determined the nature of the relations with the opposition parties.123  
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     To sum up, as the unit of analysis of this research the speeches of the prime 
ministers that addressed the opposition parties, regardless of being represented in the 
assembly, are collected and analyzed.  
 
3.4  The Cases Analyzed 
 
     There are three main periods in this research. The first period is the period of DP 
that starts with June, 1950 and ends May, 1960. This period is selected because this 
decade represents, after some failed attempts, the beginning of the multi-party politics 
of the Republic. Also, this period represents a party government period which provides 
an opportunity to observe the attitudes of single majority party toward the political 
opposition and an opportunity for a comparison with today. 
 
     The second period constitutes the AKP governments, which starts in March, 
2003 and ends July, 2010. Although AKP came to power in November, 2002 the period 
before March, 2003 is excluded. The prime-ministry of Abdullah Gül was accepted to 
be temporary by both government and opposition parties since they were preparing 
constitutional changes for the banned leader of AKP. As expected, the period with Gül 
did not last long and the leader of AKP became prime minister in March, 2003. Since 
Gül’s period is a very short and temporary period, it is assumed that it would not 
represent the actual nature of Turkish politics and thus this period is not included in this 
study. Also, AKP is still the government after July, 2010 but the period in this research 
ends with the summer recess of the TBMM in 2010.  
 
     The AKP period is selected because as DP represents the beginning of multi-
party politics, AKP represents the contemporary nature of attitudes of the governments 
toward opposition parties. Including both AKP and DP provides the ground for a 
comparison between the first and last decade of multi-party politics. This comparison is 
significant to see the development of the relation between government and opposition 
parties depending on the experience of multi-party politics. 
 
Regarding Turkish political history, it could be questioned why the other periods 
of party governments are excluded from the study. During the multi-party politics, the 
Motherland Party (ANAP) represents a long period of party government from 1983 to 
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1991. Also, the party government of the Justice Party (AP) from 1965 to 1971 could 
also be used as a period for observation. First of all, the party governments of ANAP 
and AP are not but the AKP government is included since AKP represents the current 
situation of the Turkish politics. Also, those two cases of party governments are not 
included regarding the limits of this study. This will be discussed in the limitations part 
as well, but the scope of this study does not allow including all of the party government 
examples of Turkish political history. 
 
     The third period analyzed in this study includes the coalition governments. 
These governments are included to compare the attitudes of the party governments with 
coalitions toward political oppositions. This period starts in March, 1996 and ends in 
November, 2002. Thus, it is the 20th and 21st terms of the TBMM. More precisely, 53rd, 
54th, 55th, 56th and 57th Republican governments are taken into consideration. Only the 
last two terms of the TBMM with coalition governments are selected and others are 
excluded in the light of practical considerations and the scope of the study. Also, a span 
of a recent seven years with coalitions is considered to be sufficiently long to provide 
data for an observation of the attitudes of coalition governments towards political 
opposition. 
 
     The period between 1974 and 1980 represents another long period with coalition 
governments. This period is not included since; first of all, 1990s represent a more 
contemporary situation of Turkish politics and includes a longer heritage of multi-party 
politics. It provides an opportunity to make a more up-to-date observation on Turkish 
politics.  
 
     Second, and more important, point is that the 1970s is already an extraordinary 
period of high polarization and competition between the parties. As Uyar argues, a 
government was established including the name ‘front’ for the first time and social 
events, right-left clash and terrorism were increasing gradually during this period.124 
Also, Gunter describes Turkish politics during the 1970s as the period of instability in 
which political leaders, because of the institutional and sociological causes went into 
polarization and competition although they appeared as moderate proponents of 
                                                 
124 Uyar, H. (2001). op. cit., p. 24 
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western-style democracy.125 Also, according to Sayarı, during the 1970s, the tradition of 
intense intra-elite cleavages and antagonisms in Turkish politics became even more 
accentuated as a result of the increasing ideological distance between parties. While the 
AP’s leadership sought to portray the CHP as a party infiltrated with militant Leftists, 
the CHP often denounced its principal competitor for collaborating with fascist political 
forces.126 In his recent article, Sayarı reemphasized that especially the second half of the 
1970s was one of the deadliest episodes of political violence and terrorism in Turkish 
modern history.127  
 
     According to these interpretations, the 1970s was an extraordinary time period in 
which polarization was already quite high. Why 1950s or 2000s are included in the 
study which also reflect portrays of polarization between political parties can be 
questioned. However, the polarization in these periods remained between the political 
parties and there was no mass violence between the poles of the society. In this respect, 
1970s were an extraordinary period in which political polarization, and moreover, mass 
violence were wide spread between the social groups of the society.128 Thus, the period 
of 1970s is not included which assumed to be unrepresentative for the nature of Turkish 
politics. Instead, the coalitions of 1990s are preferred rather than the 1970s, since the 
1990s carry a longer experience of multi-party politics, and political violence and 
terrorism were not present as they were present in the 1970s.  
 
     Finally, one may argue that the 1990s can also be problematic since there is the 
‘Democratic Front’ which is another kind of polarization that is observed during the 
1970s. However, the initiative of establishing a front did not last long and the alliance 
for the national elections (1999) did not come true.129 
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3.5  Data Collection and Sampling 
 
     As already discussed, speeches of the prime ministers regarding the opposition 
are the source for the data. These speeches are interpreted through some questions 
which are explained below. To code, two different types of units are used. Coding for 
some of the questions is done as full-text coding using each speech as a single unit. For 
some of the other questions each sentence from the speeches is coded as a single unit.130 
The reason for this separation is explained with the questions that are prepared for 
coding. 
 
     Source for these speeches is the daily newspapers. First of all, newspapers are 
the most common mediums between politicians and the public. So it is possible to 
follow the discourse of the politicians as well as the reactions of the governments 
towards opposition parties from the newspapers. Also, newspapers are the most proper 
source in a sense that they cover all the periods that are going to be studied in this 
research, they are properly maintained and easy to access. Other kinds of sources, like 
TV or radio channels’ databases, are not available for all of the periods that are included 
in this research and also it is not as easy to access to these kinds of sources as it is to the 
newspapers.  
 
     Considering the length of the selected periods, only two different newspapers 
have been selected for each term. It can be claimed that the selection and framing of the 
Prime Ministers’ speeches may change according to the stance of the newspapers. 
Since, there are two different newspapers selected for each term to minimize any 
possible bias. One of the newspapers is thought to be pro-government and the other one 
is against the government.131 Having only two different newspapers still could be 
considered as a limitation but the discourse of the newspapers is not the focal point of 
this research. Rather than that, the discourse and content of the speeches of the prime 
ministers are important for this research. Newspapers are used only as the agent to 
acquire these data.  
                                                 
130  See Appendix 3 for the table that presents the questions and their unit of analysis. 
 
131 For the categorization of the Turkish newspapers see Topuz, H. (2003). Türk Basın 
Tarihi [History of Turkish Press]. Đstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.  
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     For all of the three periods, Cumhuriyet is selected as one of the newspapers 
since it is available for all of the periods. Also, for all of the periods Cumhuriyet 
represents the newspaper which is more or less against the governments.  
 
     As the pro-government newspaper, two newspapers, Yeni Sabah and Zaman, are 
included in the research. For the DP period, Yeni Sabah is selected as an eminent pro-
government newspaper. Actually, for the DP period, Zafer and Ulus are perceived to be 
the actual pro and anti government newspapers.132 However, to avoid a complete 
partisan framing, more moderate newspapers are preferred. For the period of coalition 
governments, Zaman is chosen as the pro-government newspaper, since Yeni Sabah was 
not available after 1964.133 For the AKP period, as well, Zaman is chosen as the pro-
government newspaper. 
 
     To sample the data, first, a purposive sampling method which involves the 
researcher making a decision as to what units he or she deems appropriate to include in 
the sample is implemented.134 In this regard the data are collected only for the times 
when the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) was open and working. The 
purpose in doing this sampling is to reduce the large amounts of data regarding the 
scope of the study, and also, it is presupposed that most of the speeches would be made 
when the National Assembly is active. Therefore, the periods of winter and summer 
recesses of the TBMM are excluded. Then the remaining periods, in a monthly manner, 
are randomly divided among two newspapers with intention of getting equal amount of 
data from each of the newspapers. There sure are alternative methods for collecting the 
data. For instance, every other month could be collected from both of the newspapers 
but the researcher, here, intends to include all of the months in which the National 
Assembly is open for the purpose of continuousness. Thus, after distributing the months 
to the newspapers, the speeches that do not address the opposition are excluded and the 
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remaining speeches addressing the opposition are selected after a research on the 
newspapers.  
 
Below are the tables showing the formation of the sample: 
 
Table 1: Sample for the DP Period 
 Number of months 
distributed to each 
newspaper 
Number of speeches 
collected from each 
newspaper 
Percentage of the 
speeches collected 
from each newspaper 
(%) 
Cumhuriyet 37 89 50 
Yeni Sabah 38 89 50 
Total 75 182 100 
 
Table 2: Sample for the Coalition Governments Period 
 Number of 
months distributed 
to each newspaper 
Number of speeches 
collected from each 
newspaper 
Percentage of the 
speeches collected 
from each newspaper 
(%) 
Cumhuriyet 31 53 43.8 
Zaman 33 68 56.2 
Total 64 121 100 
 
Table 3: Sample for the AKP Period 
 Number of months 
distributed to each 
newspaper 
Number of speeches 
collected from each 
newspaper 
Percentage of the 
speeches collected 
from each newspaper 
(%) 
Cumhuriyet 37 184 38.3 
Zaman 36 297 61.7 
Total 73 482 100 
     
     Overall, an almost equal numbers of months are distributed to each newspaper. 
However, the sample includes more speeches from Zaman, especially for the AKP 
period. It is an expected outcome since Zaman is considered to be a pro-government 
newspaper and so it allocates more space to the government than Cumhuriyet.  
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3.6  Content Analysis 
 
     Content analysis, the methodology used in this research, is defined by Berelson 
as “a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the 
manifest content of communication.”135 However, the method has gone beyond only 
being an analysis of manifest content. With the combination of the analysis of latent and 
manifest messages, content analysis became a widely used method in social sciences 
especially for text analysis. Since this research intends to investigate the attitude of the 
governments through texts, it is assumed that the content analysis is a proper way to do 
that. 
 
3.7  Coding Questions and Coding Guide 
 
     To measure and reveal the attitude of the governments, some questions are 
formed regarding the speeches collected. These questions are formulated to capture the 
themes and streams in the speeches of the prime ministers. These questions require both 
manifest and latent coding types for the analysis. Some questions below require a 
manifest coding which is “a type of content analysis coding in which a researcher first 
develops a list of words, phrases, or symbols and then locates them in a communication 
medium.”136 Other questions require a latent coding which is “a type of content analysis 
coding in which a researcher identifies subjective meaning such as themes or motifs and 
then systematically locates them in a communication medium.”137 Depending on the 
questions formulated the data are coded and are available for results and findings. 
 
     Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software program is used to code 
the data. Below are the questions formulated for the coding, their purposes and coding 
guides: 
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1) How does the sentence consider the opposition? 
 
a. Negative  
b. Positive  
c. Neutral 
d. Uncertain 
 
This overall question is to reveal the general attitude of the government toward 
the opposition parties. This is an independent question which provides data for cross 
tabulations with other questions.   
 
The unit of analysis in this question is the sentence. Since some of the speeches 
include both positive and negative expressions together, rather than coding one 
speech as a single unit, it is preferred to divide every speech into sentences and code 
accordingly for a proper coding. 
 
The unit is coded as ‘negative’ when the subject sentence includes any kind of 
criticism, insult, aggression, competitive behavior or accusation toward the 
opposition. The unit is coded as ‘positive’ when the subject sentence includes any 
kind of appreciation, praise, cooperative expressions toward the opposition. The unit 
is coded as ‘neutral’ when the subject sentence is balanced or contains neither 
positive nor negative attitude toward the opposition. The unit is coded as ‘uncertain’ 
if the coder is uncertain whether the sentence is positive, negative or neutral.  
 
 
2) Who is the addressee in the sentence? 
 
a. Only one of the opposition parties (indicating the name of the party) 
b. More than one opposition party 
c. Opposition in general 
 
This question intends to reveal which actor has been taken in consideration as 
opposition by the governments. This question is to understand whether the 
government focuses on the main opposition party only or considers the other 
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opposition parties as well. Also, regarding the first question with a cross tabulation, 
possible differences of attitudes towards opposition parties can be observed. 
 
The unit of analysis in this question is the sentence. Since some of the speeches 
address different actors together, sentence coding is preferred for an accurate 
coding. 
 
The coder considers the active opposition parties in the subject period and codes 
the data accordingly. If the party itself, the leader of the party, or any member of the 
party is addressed then the coder codes the name of that political party. Some 
sentences are directed at more than one opposition party so in that situation, the 
coder codes as ‘more than one opposition party’. Finally, some of the sentences do 
not address any opposition party or its members, but address the opposition as the 
opposition. Then the coder codes as ‘opposition in general’. (See Appendix 2 for the 
list of opposition parties and their leaders) 
 
3) Which one of the subjects below is the focused issue in the sentence? 
 
a. Economics  
b. Foreign Policy  
c. Domestic Politics 
d. Multiple issues 
e. Not issue based 
 
Regarding the data, it is observed that some speeches specifically address 
concrete issues as economic policies, foreign policy issues or domestic politics.138 
On the other hand, some of them relate to abstract issues where there is no concrete 
issue to be discussed. This question classifies the sentences according to their 
relation with the categories above.  
 
The unit of analysis is again the sentence since some of the speeches discuss 
different issues together.  
                                                 
138 See Appendix 4 which includes the topics of the speeches for categorization of the 
speeches regarding the issues in this question. 
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This question is important in the sense that it reveals whether the government-
opposition relations occurred mostly on concrete issues or on abstract issues. Also, 
combining with the first question investigating the attitude of the governments 
regarding different concrete or abstract issues is intended. 
 
4) How does the speech address the leader/leaders of the opposition party/parties in 
person? 
 
a. Negative 
b. Positive 
c. Not Mentioned 
d. Neutral 
e. Uncertain 
 
Regarding the data, prime ministers seem to prefer distinguishing between the 
party and its leader. This attitude is important in the sense that it gives an idea about 
whether the opposition had been considered as an institution or it is recognized 
through the individual leaders. This question reveals how frequently the leaders of 
the opposition parties in person are addressed in the speeches and what the attitude 
is toward them.  
 
The unit of analysis is the speech because it is observed that most of the time a 
single party leader had been addressed in a single speech. Since the number of 
speeches including multiple party leaders are rare, coding speeches as single units is 
preferred. 
 
The coder considers the speeches addressing only the opposition party/parties 
and evaluates whether the speech addresses the leaders in person or not. (See 
Appendix 2 for the list of main opposition parties and their leaders) 
 
The unit is coded as ‘negative’ when the subject sentence includes any kind of 
criticism, insult, aggression, competitive behavior, or accusation toward the leader 
of the opposition party. The unit is coded as ‘positive’ when the subject sentence 
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includes any kind of appreciation, praise, or cooperative expressions, toward the 
leader of the opposition party. The unit is coded as ‘not mentioned’ if the sentence 
does not address the leader of the opposition party. The unit is coded as ‘neutral’ 
when the subject sentence contains neither a positive nor negative attitude toward 
the leader of the opposition party or if the coder is uncertain about the attitude in the 
sentence. Finally, unit is coded ‘uncertain’ when the unit is not consistent with the 
other categories. 
 
5) Does the speech include a pejorative word regarding the opposition?  
 
a. Yes 
b. No 
     
Regarding the data it is observed that in some cases prime ministers prefer to go 
beyond criticism and address the opposition with some pejorative or insulting 
words. This question reveals the frequency of this choice and provides an 
opportunity to interpret the attitude of government in this regard. 
 
The coder relies on a glossary for the coding. This glossary is a custom 
dictionary which is constructed by the researcher through a research and immersion 
in the message pool.139 If the speech includes one of the pejorative words listed in 
Appendix 5 then the speech is coded as ‘yes’. Otherwise it is coded as ‘no’. 
 
6) Which one of the below is addressed with a pejorative word? 
 
a. The leader of the main opposition party in person 
b. The leader/leaders of another opposition party/parties 
c. The main opposition party 
d. Another opposition party/parties 
e. Opposition in general 
 
                                                 
139 Neuendorf, A. K. (2002). op. cit., p. 127 
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This question, with a cross tabulation with the fifth question, provides data to see 
which one of the actors above is subjected to pejorative/insulting words mostly.  
 
The coder considers the opposition parties and their leaders and codes 
accordingly (See Appendix 2). 
 
7) Does the speech include any kind of threat toward the opposition? 
 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Uncertain 
 
Threat is defined as “messages of intention by the Party to behave in ways that 
are detrimental to the interests of the Other, depending on what the latter does or 
does not do.”140  
 
Occasionally, governments preferred to threaten the opposition regarding their 
opinions, critics, or policies. This behavior is important because threats constitute 
one of the conflictual and contentious tactics. This question intends to investigate 
how often the government applies this behavior. 
 
The complete speech, rather than sentence, is the unit of analysis for this 
question. The speech is coded as ‘yes’ if there is any expression of threat toward the 
opposition. Otherwise the speech is coded as ‘no’. If the coder is not sure if an 
expression is a threat or not, then the speech is coded as ‘uncertain’. 
 
8) How the interests of the nation interrelated with the opposition? 
 
a. Negative 
b. Positive 
c. Not Mentioned 
d. Neutral 
e. Uncertain 
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Apter claims, in the new nations, fear that produces factionalism, corruption, and 
separatism is pervasive.141 This situation is present in the last decades of the 
Ottoman Empire and in the politics of the Turkish Republic as well. Mardin claims, 
the first opposition party in the Ottoman Empire was accused of treason by the Party 
of Union and Progress and this pattern was repeated with other opposition parties.142 
As also Özcan claims, the state is the center in political activities. Thus, any kind of 
political opposition becomes treason.143 In this research, accusation of treason, 
betrayal to the nation, state, or country, fear of separatism or split are all titled under 
the concept of the interests of the nation. To answer the question that why 
democracy in Turkey has still not become satisfactorily entrenched, Heper claims 
that the state elite, like military officers, thinks that some in the political elite place 
political party or even personal interests above the long-term interests of the 
nation.144 This research investigates if the political elites exploit this concept against 
each other.   
 
This question intends to reveal how the governments exploited the concept of 
the interests of the nation regarding the opposition. The results from this question 
provide data which show the frequency of accusation of the opposition and de-
legitimizing the presence of the political opposition on the basis of undermining the 
interests of the nation. 
 
In this question, again, the whole speech is the unit of analysis. The speech is 
coded as ‘negative’ if the speech blames or criticizes the opposition for undermining 
the interests of the nation or betraying the interests of the nation. The speech is 
coded as ‘positive’ if the speech perceives the actions of the opposition for 
supporting the interests of the nation. Regarding the expressions on ‘the interests of 
the nation’, if the concept is not present in the speech then it is coded as ‘not 
                                                 
141 Apter, D. E. (1962). op. cit., p. 156 
 
142 Mardin, Ş. (1966). op. cit.,  p. 377 
 
143 Özcan, A. (2000). Derin Devlet ve Muhalefet Geleneği [Deep State and the Tradition 
of Opposition]. Đstanbul: Bakış Yayınları, p. 136 
 
144 Heper, M. (2000). op. cit., pp. 76-77 
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mentioned’.145 If the speech is neither negative nor positive or the tone is balanced 
then the speech is coded as ‘neutral.’ Finally, if the coder is not sure the speech is 
coded as ‘uncertain’. 
 
9) How is the attitude of the speech considering the past? 
 
a. Negative 
b. Positive 
c. Not Mentioned 
d. Neutral 
e. Uncertain 
 
It is observed from the data that governments refer to past events and history. 
This question provides data on how frequently the governments develop their 
relation with the opposition through the past and how the attitude regarding the past 
experiences is.  
 
The whole speech is coded as a single unit for this question. The unit is coded as 
‘negative’ if it presents criticism, insult, aggression, or accusation toward the 
opposition regarding the past. The unit is coded as ‘positive’ if it presents 
appreciation, praise or cooperative expressions toward the opposition regarding the 
past. If there is no reference to the past then the unit is coded as ‘not mentioned’. If 
the attitude is neither negative nor positive or the tone is balanced then it is coded as 
‘neutral’. Finally, if the attitude is not certain or if the coder is not sure then the unit 
is coded as ‘uncertain’. 
 
10) How is the attitude of the speech considering the future? 
 
a. Negative 
b. Positive 
c. Not Mentioned 
d. Neutral 
e. Uncertain 
                                                 
145 See Appendix 6 for the expressions regarding the concept of the interests of the 
nation. 
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This question is the opposite of the previous question. It is intended understand 
whether the prime ministers refers to future relations and events regarding the 
government-opposition relations. It is expected and understandable that the 
governments are mostly negative about the relations between opposition and 
government in the past. However, it is important to see if there is a hope or an effort 
to construct positive relations in the future. 
 
The whole speech is coded as a single unit for this question. The speech is coded 
as ‘negative’ if there is a negative reference regarding the future relations between 
government and opposition. It is coded as ‘positive’ if the speech includes a 
positive, hopeful or constructive meaning regarding the future relations. If there is 
no reference toward the future then the speech is coded as ‘not mentioned’. If the 
reference toward the future is not negative or positive then it is coded as ‘neutral’. 
In a case when the meaning is not certain or the coder is not sure about the meaning 
then it is coded as ‘uncertain’. 
 
3.8  Reliability Test 
 
     As Neuendorf claims, “to stand on indisputable ground, content analysts must be 
confident that their data mean the same thing for everyone who uses them.”146 In other 
words, the data must be replicable and verifiable for a proper research. Although the 
coding of the whole data set is completed by a single coder, since large numbers of units 
are coded, it is a significant point to measure the reliability and reproducibility of the 
coding questions. For this reason a reliability test is implemented before coding all of 
the data and obtaining results.147 It should be noted that only the fifth question was 
omitted in the reliability test since the coding for that question is made through a 
glossary that leaves subjectivity out of consideration.  
 
                                                 
146 Neuendorf, A. K. (2002). op. cit.,  p. 211 
 
147 To conduct the reliability test, a scholar from the Conflict Analysis and Resolution 
discipline voluntarily coded a part of the sample. The same part also coded by the 
researcher and measurement of Kappa is applied on both of the coders’ results to reveal 
the reliability level. 
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     For this test, Cohen’s Kappa is used which is also available in SPSS. Kappa is a 
statistic that measures how much better than chance the agreement is between a pair of 
coders on the presence or absence of binary themes in texts.148  
 
     The results of the reliability test for each question are given in Table 5. 
However, before presenting the results, it is important to mention how much inter-coder 
agreement is enough for Kappa measurement. In fact there are no certain scores about 
this issue. According to Bernard, “many researchers are satisfied with kappa values of 
around 0.70, while others like to shoot for 0.80 and higher.”149 The table below, 
presented by Landis and Koch, can be referred to evaluate the reliability of the coding 
questions of this research. 
 
Table 4:Kappa Scores Categorization
150
 
Kappa Interpretation 
<0 Poor Agreement 
0.0-0.20 Slight Agreement 
0.21-0.40 Fair Agreement 
0.41-0.60 Moderate Agreement 
0.61-0.80 Substantial Agreement 
0.81-1.00 Almost Perfect Agreement 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
148 Bernard, H. R. (2000). Social Research Methods. California: Sage Publications,  
p. 460 
 
149 Ibid., p. 461 
 
150 Landis, J. R. and Koch, G. G. (1977). “The Measurement of Observer Agreement for 
Categorical Data,” Biometrics, 33(1), p. 165 
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Based on Kappa’s measurement, the results of the comparison of the two coders 
for the questions employed in this study are in Table 5: 
 
Table 5: Reliability Test Results (Kappa Scores) 
Question Value Interpretation 
#1 0.698 Substantial Agreement 
#2 0.721 Substantial Agreement 
#3 0.691 Substantial Agreement 
#4 0.684 Substantial Agreement 
#6 0.729 Substantial Agreement 
#7 1 Almost Perfect Agreement 
#8 0.689 Substantial Agreement 
#9 0.641 Substantial Agreement 
#10 0.651 Substantial Agreement 
 
 Substantial agreements are acquired for all of the questions except for question 7 
in which an almost perfect agreement is achieved. It is tenable to argue that the results 
of the reliability test for the coded questions have achieved their purpose of establishing 
the reliability of the data in question. 
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4  FIDIGS  
 
 
 
     This chapter, first of all, presents the results on the comparison of two party 
governments of the 1950s versus the 2000s. With this comparison the first hypothesis of 
this research will be tested. In other words, it is intended to investigate if the length of 
the experience of multi-party politics had affected the attitudes of the ruling parties 
toward the opposition parties. As it was stated, the comparison of party governments is 
done with the DP and AKP party governments.  
 
     The results on the comparison of party and coalition governments will be 
presented in this chapter as well. This comparison corresponds to the second hypothesis 
of this research. Whether a significant difference between the attitudes of the party 
governments and coalition governments toward the opposition parties exists or not is 
questioned. In comparison with the party governments that are given above, the 
coalition governments between 1996 and 2002 are included in the analysis to observe 
the difference of the attitudes between the party governments and coalition governments 
toward the opposition parties.  
 
     The tables and charts below include the findings both for the party governments 
and coalition governments. 
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4.1  General View on the Consideration of the Opposition 
 
Table 6: Consideration of the Opposition Parties by Governing Parties 
How does the sentence 
consider the opposition? DP (%) AKP (%) Coalitions (%) 
Negative 64.7 84.7 52.8 
Neutral 17.0 7.3 23.5 
Positive 16.5 3.4 21.8 
Uncertain 1.8 4.7 2.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
N 1018 4041 400 
 
     Table 6 presents the results for the general consideration of the opposition 
parties by the governments. When the two party governments are compared, the from 
the first two columns show that neither the DP’s nor AKP’s prime ministers had 
positive or at least neutral stance toward the opposition parties. In both of the periods, 
both positive and neutral interactions represent minor percentages where negatives have 
the biggest portions. In fact, it is expected, and somehow acceptable, to have negative 
results to be dominant since the opposition parties are the rivals of the government and 
it would not be realistic to have, most of the time, positive interactions. Yet, the great 
difference between the negative and positive results is significant to see the solid 
negative stance toward the opposition parties. First two columns of this table suggest 
that opposition parties are mostly treated with negative attitudes. 
 
     Still, what is more striking is the increase of negative sentences and decrease of 
the positive sentences from the DP to AKP period. In fact, DP in particular reflects a 
hopeful picture. The sum of neutral and positive percentages is somehow balanced with 
the negative percentage although it is still lower. In the case of AKP, while the 
percentage of negatives is rising significantly, the positive sentences tended to 
disappear. The balanced attitude replaced with more negative attitude toward the 
opposition in the AKP period. 
 
     The general picture on the attitude of the DP and AKP governments toward the 
opposition parties shows that in both of the cases the percentage of negative sentences is 
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more than the others, but in spite of the long experience of multi-party politics, in the 
contemporary period negative attitude becomes considerably dominant. 
 
       When the different types of governments are compared the picture is different. 
The percentage of negative sentences becomes almost equal with the sum of positive 
and neutral sentences in the coalition governments’ period. In other words, if one of the 
two sentences of the prime minister is negative toward the opposition then the other one 
is neutral or positive. The result on the coalition governments presents a hopeful picture 
for the government-opposition relations and the development of political opposition in 
politics when it is compared with the party governments’ results. 
 
 
     Figure 1 shows the distribution of negative, positive, and neutral sentences 
during the DP government throughout the years. There are two significant points in this 
figure. First of all, although there are some fluctuations, the ratio of negative sentences 
is always higher than the positive and neutral sentences except the year 1953. In fact, 
until 1953 the percentage of positive and neutral sentences had been increasing. This 
could be interpreted that during the first years of its government DP wanted to acquire 
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at least stable relations with the opposition parties. DP was elected as a hope for 
democracy. Democratic Party leaders had promised for the democratic developments 
which also include the presence of political opposition in the political sphere. In this 
regard, it is observed that the interaction with the opposition parties developed 
positively during the first years. 
 
     However, with the 1954 national elections the situation started to change. In the 
next years, the ratio of positive and neutral sentences decreased to very low levels and 
the presence of negative sentences increased. Even in some years the frequencies of 
positives in the sample of this research decreased to zero. The hopeful and balanced 
attitude toward the opposition seem to be lasted only for the first period of the DP 
government. During the second and third periods the negative attitude becomes more 
dominant. The internal dynamics of the DP period which shape this distribution is not in 
the scope of this research, but it can be suggested from this chart that in the first period 
when the ruling party was fresh, and trying to secure its position in the government, it 
initiated less negative or more cooperative attitudes toward the opposition parties. 
However, with the second and third periods of its government the negative attitude of 
the party government emerges.  
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     Figure 2 presents the results for the AKP government. Similar with the DP’s 
results, the first year of the AKP government constitutes a time of cooperation and 
compromise with the opposition. The percentage of negative sentences is at its lowest 
point, and the percentage of positives is at its highest level. Like the DP, the AKP was 
elected with a hope of democratization and it came to government with a support of 
wide consensus. So, AKP could have intended to keep good relations with the 
opposition parties. However, this balanced attitude did not last long and starting with 
only one year after its election, the AKP reflected totally negative attitudes toward the 
opposition parties. For the rest of the years of its reign in government the frequencies of 
positive and neutral remain low, but the frequency of negatives increases steadily. 
 
     For both the DP and the AKP, as the Figures 1 and 2 together represent, that the 
longer the party government stays in power the more the positive attitudes decrease and 
the presence of negative attitudes increase. Both of the periods reflect a positive state in 
the beginning, but negative in the remaining.  
 
However, there are three significant differences appear when these two figures 
are compared. Firstly, the AKP’s length of positive attitude toward the opposition 
parties is shorter than that of the DP’s. The first three years of DP rule reflects a balance 
between negative and positive attitudes. Moreover, in 1953 the percentage of positive 
sentences exceeds the percentage of negative sentences. However, the similar balanced 
period last only for one year in the AKP government. 
 
The second significant difference is that during the DP’s reign in power although 
the percentages of negative sentences are higher, there is fluctuation throughout the 
years. The DP does not present a solid negative attitude toward opposition parties. 
However, the AKP’s picture is quite different. After its first year of government, AKP 
reflects a solid and continuing negative stance toward opposition parties.  
 
Finally, the difference between the percentages of negative and positive 
sentences is higher in the AKP period when it is compared with the DP government. 
Thus, these two figures suggest that despite the long experience of multi-party politics, 
the contemporary situation of government’s attitude toward the opposition parties is 
more negative than the beginning of multi-party politics.  
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Figure 3 shows the results for the coalition governments over the years. Firstly, 
percentages of negatives and others seem to be more balanced when they are compared 
with the party governments. Coalition governments appear to be less negative toward 
the opposition parties when they are compared with the party governments.  
 
     Secondly, the last three years represent the most positive picture on the attitude 
of the governments toward the opposition parties. The period until 1999 does not 
present a stable political life since there are several different coalition governments with 
short periods of ruling. None of those coalition governments felt themselves secure and 
strong enough to develop better relations with the opposition parties. However, with the 
1999 national elections, a stronger and more stable coalition government was formed 
between DSP, MHP, and ANAP. Between 1999 and 2002 the negative and positive 
attitudes represent their most balanced period. This balance is significant since it 
provides a ground for constructive and cooperative relations between the government 
and opposition parties. 
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      These figures show a common point between party and coalition governments. 
The most positive pictures appear in the cases of DP and AKP governments during their 
first years. The same applies for the 57th Republican government as well. The year 2000 
represents the most positive situation during the government of DSP-MHP-ANAP 
coalition. It can be interpreted that although the coalition governments reflect much 
more positive predisposition of the governments’ leaders toward the opposition parties 
than the party governments, regardless of the government type the first years of the 
governments represent more positive picture toward the opposition parties than the rest 
of their governing periods since the elections are just over, both government and 
opposition are trying to determine their position and relation between the political actors 
are just new and fresh. 
 
4.2  Who is the Opposition? 
 
     In this part, the characteristics of the opposition will be analyzed. Table 7 shows 
which actors were considered by the governments as the reference point of the 
opposition.  
 
Table 7: The Addresse 
Who is addressed in the sentence? 
DP (%) AKP (%) Coalitions (%) 
Republican People's Party 59.2 42.2 22.8 
Opposition in General 36.9 40.8 43.0 
Nation Party 1.6 - - 
Liberty Party 1.5 - - 
Nationalist Movement Party - 8.0 - 
HADEP & DEHAP & DTP & 
BDP 
- 3.8 3.3 
Young Party - 0.8 - 
RP & FP & SP - - 13.5 
True Path Party - - 7.8 
Justice and Development Party - - 3.5 
Motherland Party - - 2.0 
Multiple Parties 0.5 3.8 2.0 
Others 0.3 0.6 2.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
N 1018 4041 400 
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     Table 7 indicates that during the party governments the main opposition party 
(CHP) is the actor which is mostly addressed in the speeches of the prime ministers. An 
interesting point is that although the CHP was not the main opposition party during the 
period of coalition governments, it appeared as the party which was mostly addressed 
by the prime ministers of the time. The main opposition party of the period of coalition 
governments, RP (then FP and SP), comes after the CHP. 
 
     Another significant result is about the category of ‘opposition in general’. This 
category refers to the statements of the prime ministers when they do not address any of 
the opposition parties in particular but address the whole opposition. In a considerable 
portion of the sample, the prime ministers of the party governments and also coalitions 
preferred to address the entire opposition without identifying an opposition party in 
particular.  
 
     During the party governments, in both of the cases, prime ministers did not 
intend to address other opposition parties much. However, if the coalition period is 
compared with the party governments there appears to be a more balanced distribution 
among the opposition parties. This might be mostly because in the period of party 
governments the TBMM includes less number of parties than the period of coalition 
governments. So, the prime ministers of the party governments do not need to address 
other opposition parties which are out of the Assembly and are not effective in the 
politics.   
 
Table 8: Overall consideration of the Opposition * The addressee in the sentence 
Crosstabulation-DP 
The addressee in the sentence 
 
CHP (%) 
Opposition in General 
(%) HP (%) MP (%) 
Negative 66.2 61.7 73.3 75.0 
Neutral 17.1 17.3 13.3 6.3 
Positive 15.4 18.4 13.3 18.8 
Overall 
Consideration 
Uncertain 1.3 2.7 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N 603 376 15 16 
ote: Cramer’s V151= 0.26 (Statistically significant at 0.95 confidence level) 
 
 
                                                 
151 Cramer’s V presents the association between two different variables. It varies from 0 (no association) 
to 1 (complete association).  
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Table 9: Overall consideration of the Opposition * The addressee in the sentence 
Crosstabulation-AKP 
The addressee in the sentence 
 
CHP (%) 
Opposition in 
General (%) 
DEHAP & DTP 
& BDP (%) MHP (%)  
Negative 87.1 80.9 89.5 87.8  
Neutral 6.1 9.3 4.3 4.6  
Positive 2.0 5.2 2.5 1.5  
Overall 
Consideration  
Uncertain 4.8 4.6 3.7 6.1  
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N 1707 1649 156 322 
 
ote: Cramer’s V= 0.15 (Statistically significant at 0.95 confidence level) 
 
     Tables 8 and 9 show that the negative attitudes toward each opposition party 
increase in the AKP period when it is compared with the DP period. This supports the 
previous result that the negative position becomes more dominant in the AKP period. 
Also, these tables show that whether the addressee is CHP, another party, or the 
opposition in general the percentages of negative and positive sentences are close to 
each other in both of the cases. It appears that the prime ministers of the party 
governments addressed the CHP the most, but they did not assume different attitudes 
toward different opposition parties and prime ministers treated all of the opposition 
parties negatively. 
Table 10: Overall consideration of the Opposition * The addressee in the sentence 
Crosstabulation-Coalitions 
ote: Cramer’s V= 0.35 (Statistically significant at 0,95 confidence level) 
 
The addressee in the sentence 
 Opposition 
in General 
(%) CHP (%) FP (%) DYP (%) AKP (%) 
HADEP 
(%) 
Negative 39.0 72.5 77.8 25.8 64.3 92.3 
Neutral 26.2 22.0 20.1 25.8 28.6 7.7 
Positive 32.6 4.4 2.1 38.7 7.1 0.0 
Overall 
consideration 
 of the 
Opposition 
Uncertain 2.3 1.1 0.0 9.7 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N 172 91 54 31 14 13 
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     When the results for the coalition period are observed from Table 10, three 
interesting points appear. First of all, there is no positive sentence directed at the 
People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) which gets most of its support from the Kurdish 
population of Turkey. When compared with the other opposition parties HADEP is the 
party with the highest frequency of negative attitude. Previously it was concluded that 
the coalition governments were the closest to have positive or at least neutral attitudes 
toward the opposition parties. However, this result appears to be invalid for the parties 
which are supported mostly by Kurds. This case is also apparent in the AKP period. 
According to Table 9, such parties of the AKP period like Democratic Society Party 
(DTP) and Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) get the highest frequency of negative 
attitude as well.  
 
     Secondly, as a single case, the True Path Party (DYP) appears as the opposition 
party which was addressed with positive sentences more than negatives. This is because 
DYP was a potential partner for a coalition government. Finally, the high level of 
positive and neutral results for the category of opposition in general is interesting. When 
an opposition party is addressed in particular then the negative attitude of the coalition 
governments appear to be similar with the party governments. However, in the category 
of opposition in general, the frequencies of positive and neutral sentences increase 
significantly. The positive stance of the coalition governments, which is presented in 
Table 6, is apparent if the opposition is addressed without an opposition party in 
particular. Otherwise, when an opposition party is addressed in the speeches of the 
prime ministers in particular, then the attitude of the coalition governments is similar 
with the party governments.  
 
4.3  The Issues 
 
     This part includes the basic issues of the interaction between the governments 
and the opposition parties. Dividing speeches into their subjects provides a clear basis 
for the analysis. This table provides an opportunity to understand if the prime ministers 
assume different discourses regarding the issue categories. Table 11 below presents the 
distribution of the issues among the party and coalition governments. 
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Table 11: The Issue
152
 
 
 
        Table 11 shows that among the concrete discussions, domestic politics appears 
as the most common issue category between the government and opposition in each 
period. Economy and foreign politics are not in consideration much in both party and 
coalition governments’ periods. The significant difference, in this table, is that for the 
DP government most of the interactions were based on abstract issues. In the AKP 
government, as well as the coalition governments, most of the interactions were based 
on domestic politics. This suggests that in the contemporary period the interaction with 
the opposition occurred mostly on concrete issues and specifically on domestic politics.  
 
 
 
Table 12: The Issue-DP 
Consideration of the Opposition * The Issue 
Democratic Party 
 
None of the Issues 
(%) 
Domestic Politics 
(%) 
Economics  
(%) 
Foreign Policy 
(%) 
Negative 59.8 75.9 67.2 53.8 
Neutral 15.8 16.6 22.4 25.0 
Positive 22.5 5.5 10.4 19.2 
 
Uncertain 1.9 2.0 0.0 1.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N 582 307 67 52 
ote: Cramer’s V= 0.15 (Statistically significant at 0.95 confidence level) 
 
                                                 
152 See Appendix 4 for the categories of the issues. 
What is the issue in the 
sentence? DP (%) AKP (%) Coalitions (%) 
Non Issue Based 57.2 36.7 32.5 
Domestic Politics 30.2 54.1 59.5 
Economics 6.6 6.3 4.5 
Foreign Policy 5.1 2.8 3.5 
Multiple Issues 1.0 0.1 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
N 1018 4041 400 
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Table 13: The Issue-AKP 
Consideration of the Opposition * The Issue  
Justice and Development Party 
 
Domestic 
Politics (%) 
None of the Issues 
(%) 
Economics 
(%) 
Foreign Policy 
(%) 
Negative 82.6 86.6 95.3 75.0 
Neutral 8.7 6.1 1.6 7.1 
Positive 3.5 3.0 0.8 12.5 
 
Uncertain 5.2 4.3 2.4 5.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N 2187 1485 254 112 
ote: Cramer’s V= 0.13 (Statistically significant at 0.95 confidence level) 
 
Table 14: The Issue-Coalition Governments 
Consideration of the Opposition * The Issue 
Coalitions 
 
Domestic 
Politics (%) 
None of the Issues 
(%) 
Economics  
(%) 
Foreign Policy 
(%) 
Negative 46.6 65.4 66.7 21.4 
Neutral 26.1 21.5 16.7 7.1 
Positive 25.2 13.1 11.1 57.1 
 
Uncertain 2.1 0.0 5.6 14.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N 238 130 18 14 
ote: Cramer’s V= 0.19 (Statistically significant at 0.95 confidence level) 
 
     Tables 12, 13, and 14 above show the distribution of the sentences regarding the 
concrete or abstract interactions with the opposition parties. These tables suggest that in 
all of the periods, foreign policy issues are the issues in which the most positive 
relations had been developed. In the AKP period, although the negative attitude is 
dominant regarding the foreign policy issues, it was in this category that the least 
negative stance was expressed toward the opposition. Furthermore, in the DP period the 
negative and non-negative ratios of statements including foreign policy issues are 
almost equal. Even better, in the period of coalitions foreign policy issues appear as the 
category of cooperation between the government and opposition. According to Oran, 
until the 1960s, foreign policy was accepted as a national issue and questioning foreign 
policy decisions was accepted as a sign of anti-national attitude. He claims that 
disagreements between political parties were only related to domestic politics and for 
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the foreign policy issues, which should be national, a common position should be set.153 
The tables above are parallel with Oran and suggest that foreign policy issues are the 
issues that Turkish parties had less problem to deal with.  
 
     Among the issue based interactions, domestic politics appear as the most 
frequent category in all of the three periods. The positive attitude in the coalition 
governments reflect on the domestic issues as well. The total of negative sentences is 
lower than the sum of neutral and positive sentences. However, both in the DP and AKP 
periods, domestic politics constitutes the sharpest separation domain between the 
government and opposition.  
 
     Regarding the non-issue based interactions, in the DP period the negative and 
non-negative percentages for the non issue based discussions are almost equal. For the 
other two periods negatives are dominant. 
 
     Finally, what is striking in these tables is the gap between the negatives and the 
others in each of the categories in the AKP period. It was discussed that in spite of the 
50 years of experience of multi-party politics, the negative stance is more apparent in 
the period of AKP and this reflects on the issue categories as well. Even concerning the 
foreign policy issues, there is a strong negative stance toward the opposition parties.  
 
4.4  Opposition Party Leaders 
 
     In this part the frequency of the interaction of the prime ministers with the 
leaders of the opposition parties, and the nature of this interaction will be analyzed. The 
table below presents the numbers regarding this analysis. This observation is significant 
since it gives an idea whether the opposition parties are recognized as constituted of 
individual leaders or as institutional bodies. 
 
                                                 
153 Oran, B. (2002). Türk Dış Politikası [Turkish Foreign Policy]. Đstanbul: Đletişim 
Yayınları, p. 78  
 
 65 
Table 15: Party Leader 
How does the speech address the 
leader/leaders of the opposition 
party/parties in person? DP (%) AKP (%) Coalitions (%) 
Negative 24.2 36.9 16.5 
Positive 3.3 1.5 10.7 
Neutral 1.6 1.9 8.3 
Uncertain 0.0 0.4 1.7 
 
Total 29.1 40.7 37.2 
 Not Mentioned 70.9 59.3 62.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N 182 482 121 
     
     According to the Table 15, during the DP period, the frequency of addressing the 
leaders of the opposition parties in person was considerable, but it was not as frequent 
as has been the case with the AKP period. Table 15 shows that the leaders of the 
opposition parties were addressed most frequently in the AKP period. Almost half of 
the speeches address the leader or leaders of the opposition parties in person. Also, the 
already low frequency of positive speeches decreased even further in the AKP period 
and almost all of the interactions with the opposition leaders observed to be negative in 
this period.  
 
     The results on DP and AKP show two significant points. First of all, frequency 
of the interaction with the leaders of the opposition parties increased in contemporary 
politics. Secondly, the negative attitude of the prime ministers toward these leaders 
increased as well. This individualistic approach has the danger of escalation of the 
conflicts between political leaders since the positive attitude is almost not present. 
Destructive examples of interactions between A. Menderes and Đ. Đnönü or R. T. 
Erdoğan and the leaders of opposition parties were very common. These results might 
be interpreted as that the political discourse is more individualistic rather than 
institutional.  
 
     Lijphart claims that even in the politically diverse societies, it is possible to 
develop consensus and democratic stability if only the political elites could develop 
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consensus among themselves.154 Similarly, Diamond claims that presence of trust 
among political actors, willingness to cooperate, accommodate, and compromise are 
significant elements of democratic political culture that keep the balance between 
conflict and consensus.155 In the Turkish context, in view of the preceding empirical 
evidence, Turkish political elites appear to be problematic on developing positive 
relations. 
 
     However, when the coalition governments are compared with the party 
governments the picture becomes more positive. The frequency of interaction with the 
leaders is greater than the DP period and almost equal with the AKP period but the 
attitude of the coalition governments toward the opposition parties are quite different 
from the party governments. The percentage of positive speeches is higher, and the sum 
of neutral and positive speeches is higher than the number of negative speeches. This 
suggests that the nature of the relations is far more positive during the period of 
coalition governments than the period of party governments. 
 
4.5  Pejorative Words 
 
     Pejorative words are considered as the most destructive way of interaction 
between the government and opposition. The speeches with pejorative words considered 
to be breaking off the communication between the government and opposition parties. 
These speeches are considered to be escalating the conflicts to non-solvable stages. In 
this regard, the table below constitutes one of the most significant results of this 
research. 
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Table 16: Pejorative Words 
Does the speech include 
a pejorative word? 
DP (%) AKP (%) Coalitions (%) 
No 83.5 92.3 100.0 
Yes 16.5 7.7 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
N 182 482 121 
 
     The 16.5% of pejorative words in the speeches of DP’s prime minister reflects 
that the destructive political discourse was remarkably present in the Adnan Menderes’ 
discourse. The ratio appears to be low, but when the nature of pejorative words is 
considered then the conflictual discourse becomes more apparent. The decrease from 
16.5% to 7.7% in the AKP period presents a positive development on the attitude of the 
government toward the opposition. This ratio still could be considered as high, but at 
least there is a significant decrease when the contemporary situation compared with the 
early period of the multi-party politics. In particular of the party governments, previous 
results had shown that the negative attitude of the government toward the opposition is 
increasing. However, Table 16 is indicative of the fact that the situation is better than 
before. 
 
     The most significant result of this table is about the coalition governments. The 
sample of speeches from the coalition governments includes no pejorative word. This 
result is parallel with the positive findings presented so far on coalition governments.  
  
Table 17: The Addressee of the Pejorative Words 
 DP (%) AKP (%) 
The Leader of the Main Opposition Party 46.7 29.7 
Opposition in General 33.3 51.4 
The Main Opposition Party 16.7 16.2 
Another Opposition Party/Parties 3.3 0.0 
 
The Leader/Leaders of Another Opposition 
Party/Parties 
0.0 2.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 
N 182 482 
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     Table 17 shows who was addressed with the pejorative words during the DP and 
AKP governments. During the DP governments almost half of the pejorative words are 
directed toward the leader of the main opposition party. Similarly, in the period of the 
AKP governments, the percentage of pejorative words toward the leader of the main 
opposition emerges as the second most frequent category. This finding is parallel with 
the interpretation above that the individualistic approach in the political discourse has 
the potential of escalating the conflicts between the party leaders. Combining this table 
with the Table 15, it could be suggested that the interactions between the party leaders 
have the potential of escalating the level of conflicts. For instance, this table gives an 
idea about the negative relation between Adnan Menderes and Đsmet Đnönü. However, 
the positive development in the period of AKP is that the percentage of pejorative 
words toward the party leader decreases. This result suggests that the risk of individual 
conflicts between the leaders is less in the contemporary situation.  
 
     Another positive side of the AKP period is that, while the percentage of the 
references in the category of opposition in general increases, the frequency references of 
the other categories decreases. The prime minister of AKP mostly preferred to use 
pejorative words without identifying a person in particular. 
 
4.6  Threats 
 
     As mentioned above, threats are categorized as one of contentious tactics and 
one of the ways to escalate the conflict between the parties.156 Therefore the presence of 
threats in the speeches of the prime ministers is investigated. The table below presents 
the percentages of the presence of threats in the speeches. 
Table 18: Threats 
Does the speech include a 
threat? DP (%) AKP (%) Coalitions (%) 
No 96.7 98.8 99.2 
Yes 3.3 1.2 0.8 
Uncertain 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
N 182 482 121 
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     Data presented in Table 18 indicate that, the ratios of the threats in the sampled 
speeches are very low for all of the three cases. Similar to the case of pejorative words, 
there is a positive development. The presence of threats decreases from the DP to the 
AKP governments. In the period of coalition governments the percentage is lower than 
both of the party governments. However, the percentages of different types of 
governments do not represent a significant difference. So, in the limits of this study, the 
presence of threats does not appear to be a significant drawback of Turkish political 
discourse in the cases of both party and coalition governments. Also, the decrease on 
the existence of threats in the recent times is a positive development. 
 
4.7  The Interests of the ation 
 
     In this part the concept of the interests of the nation is going to be investigated 
regarding the government-opposition relations. In this study, as discussed in the third 
chapter, the employment of this concept is considered to be a way of de-legitimizing the 
opposition parties by presenting them as harming the interests of the state, nation or 
country. The table below shows the distribution of the frequency of the prime ministers 
using this concept toward the political opposition. 
 
Table 19: Interests of the ation 
 
DP 
(%) 
DP 
Valid (%) 
AKP 
(%) 
AKP 
Valid (%) 
Coalitions 
(%) 
Coalitions 
Valid (%) 
Negative 23.1 67.7 28.4 96.5 10.8 72.2 
Positive 7.7 22.6 0.0 0.0 4.2 27.8 
Neutral 1.6 4.8 0.4 1.4 0.0 0.0 
Uncertain 1.6 4.8 .6 2.1 0.0 0.0 
Valid Total 34.1 100.0 29.5 100.0 15 100.0 
Missing 
Not 
Mentioned 65.9  70.5  85  
Total 100.0  100.0  100,0  
N 182 62 482 142 121 19 
 
     According to Table 19, in 34.1% of the speeches of Menderes the concept of 
interests of the nation was used, and most of the time (67.7%) used in a negative way 
toward the opposition parties. Only 22.6% of the speeches, which refer to the concept, 
were positive. Although the picture in the DP period is negative, the situation becomes 
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worse when it is compared with the AKP period. The percentage of the presence of the 
concept in the speeches is close to what it was during the DP period. However, the 
striking finding is that almost all of the time the prime minister of the AKP used this 
concept in a negative way. In the sample of this study, there is no speech in which the 
prime minister expressed that the opposition is working for the interests of the nation. 
Just like in many other tables above, the picture became more negative in the 
contemporary situation. 
 
     The picture is not promising even in the period of coalition governments. In fact, 
the concept is not as frequently used as in the periods of party governments. Only 
14.8% of the speeches include the concept. However, the percentage of negative 
speeches is even higher than the DP period. According to the results of this study, in the 
case of interests of the nation coalition governments do not present a hopeful picture 
either. Opposition parties seem to be recognized as a harm and threat to the interests of 
the nation even in the period of coalition governments. 
 
4.8  Past and Future Orientations 
 
     This final part includes how frequent the governments referred to the past 
actions of the opposition parties or to the future of the relations when they interact with 
the opposition parties. The past and future orientations are investigated to understand 
the nature of the interaction. Table 20 presents the results for the past orientation and 
Table 21 presents the results for the future orientation. 
 
Table 20: Past Orientation 
Whether there is a 
consideration 
toward the past 
DP 
(%) 
DP 
Valid  
(%) 
AKP 
(%) 
AKP 
Valid  
(%) 
Coalitions 
(%) 
Coalitions 
Valid  
(%) 
Negative 39.0 95.9 37.8 95.3 18.2 88.0 
Positive 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.2 0.8 4.0 
Neutral 0.5 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Uncertain 1.1 2.7 0.2 0.5 1.7 8.0 
Valid 
Total 40.7 100.0 39.6 100.0 20.7 100.0 
Missing Not 
Mentioned 
59.3 
 60.4  79.3  
Total 100.0  100,0  100.0  
N 182 74 482 191 121 26 
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     According to Table 20, almost 40% of the speeches of the prime ministers of the 
party governments include a reference to the past actions, policies of the opposition 
parties or past of the government-opposition relations. The percentage decreases in half 
in the period of coalition governments. However, when these past references are 
investigated, both in the periods of party and coalition governments the reference to the 
past is, almost totally, made in a negative way. Especially, in the DP period, there is no 
speech in the sample that includes a positive reference to the past actions of the 
opposition parties, mostly of the CHP.  
 
     These findings suggest that even the political elites of the coalition governments 
are negatively predisposed toward the opposition parties as if they did nothing good for 
the benefit of the country in the past. This finding is also parallel with the use of the 
concept of the interests of the nation. In all cases political opposition is presented as an 
actor which mostly harms the nation and state. 
 
Table 21: Future Orientation 
If there is a 
consideration 
toward the future 
DP  
(%) 
DP 
Valid 
(%) 
AKP 
(%) 
AKP 
Valid  
(%) 
Coalitions 
(%) 
Coalitions 
Valid  
(%) 
Positive 16.5 62.5 6.2 48.4 18.2 84.6 
Negative 7.7 29.2 4.4 33.9 2.5 11.5 
Neutral 1.6 6.3 1.9 14.5 0.8 3.8 
Uncertain 0.5 2.1 0.4 3.2 0.0 0.0 
Valid 
Total 26.4 100.0 12.9 100.0 21.5 100.0 
Missing Not 
Mentioned 
73.6  87.1  78.5  
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  
N 182 48 482 62 121 27 
 
     In contrast to Table 20, Table 21 presents the future references of the prime 
ministers toward the opposition parties. This investigation gives an idea about whether 
the prime ministers are willing to develop positive relations with the opposition parties 
in the future. 
 
     According to Table 21, future reference is not present in the speeches of the 
prime ministers of the party governments as much as the references to the past. Also, 
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the percentage of the speeches with future references decreases from the DP to AKP 
period. The positive side is that the percentage of positive references is higher than the 
negative references in both of the party government periods. This suggests that party 
governments intended to establish better relations in the future, at least in their 
discourse. The negative side is that the percentage of positive speeches decreases when 
the AKP period compared with the DP period.  
 
     When the coalition governments are considered, the percentage of speeches 
including future references is almost the same with the DP period, and higher than the 
AKP period. However, the percentage of positive speeches regarding the future is quite 
high in comparison to the party governments’ results. Only very low percentage of 
speeches includes negative attitudes toward the opposition. The positive stance of the 
prime ministers of the coalition governments is apparent in the case of future 
expectations. 
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5  COCLUSIO 
 
 
 
5.1  Conjectures 
 
     This study presented a comparison of the attitudes of the prime ministers of the 
party and coalition governments toward the opposition parties and their leaders in 
different time periods and different types of governments in Turkish politics. The party 
governments of the 1950s and 2000s were selected to analyze whether the length of the 
experience of multi-party politics had influenced the attitudes of the governing parties 
toward the political opposition. Also, the coalition governments between 1996 and 2002 
are included in the research to observe whether there is a difference of attitudes of the 
party governments and coalition governments toward the political opposition. The 
speeches of the prime ministers are collected from the three Turkish daily newspapers 
(Cumhuriyet, Yeni Sabah and Zaman). Ten different questions are formed to evaluate 
the data with content analysis. 
 
     The first hypothesis of this research was that as long as the Turkish political 
system experiences multi-party politics, the presence of political opposition is 
recognized and internalized by the governments. This hypothesis corresponds to the 
comparison of the DP and AKP party governments. After experiencing multi-party 
politics for over fifty years, it was anticipated that the party government of the 2000s 
would express a more positive and cooperative attitude toward the opposition parties. It 
was expected that the government would recognize the political opposition as one of the 
natural and necessary actors of the democratic system. 
 
However, the findings from the comparison of the DP and AKP governments do 
not support the hypothesis above. First of all, regarding the overall stance of the 
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opposition, the results of this study present that while the percentage of negative 
interactions with the opposition parties increases significantly from the DP to the AKP 
period, the percentage of positive interactions decreases. Also, when these interactions 
are evaluated throughout the years, AKP government held a stable negative stance 
through its period of power while there are some fluctuations in the DP period. 
Although DP was also negative toward the opposition parties, it does not present total 
negative stance in all of the years. This situation is interpreted that the contemporary 
government felt less necessary to adjust its position regarding the opposition parties 
than the DP government.  
 
Regarding the legitimacy of the political opposition in the eyes of the ruling 
parties, the concept of the interests of the nation is observed in this study. The results 
presented that the AKP government exploited this concept more frequently, and also, in 
a more negative way to de-legitimize and condemn the opposition parties than the DP 
government did. This result is significant since it suggests that although the opposition 
and opposition parties are present for more than 50 years, the contemporary government 
is more accusive about the presence of opposition parties regarding the interests of the 
nation. 
 
In the category of past references, the AKP government appears as much 
negative as the DP government. Regarding the future of the relations with the 
opposition parties, the findings on the AKP governments reflect a much more negative 
attitude than the DP governments had which suggest that it becomes harder for the 
governing elites of the government party to develop better relations with the opposition 
parties in the contemporary situation. Thus, in spite of the long experience of multi-
party system, the contemporary government appears to be more negative regarding the 
past and future of the relations with the opposition parties. 
 
The more negative picture of AKP government reflects on the issue categories as 
well. The attitude of the AKP government is more negative in all of the issue categories. 
Even in the foreign policy issues that the governments had the most positive relations 
with the opposition parties, the AKP governments expressed sharper attitude toward the 
opposition parties than the DP governments did. 
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Finally, the frequency of the interaction with the opposition parties’ leaders 
increases from DP to the AKP period. The increasing individual-level of interaction 
becomes more negative in the AKP government. This situation has the potential of more 
individual conflicts between party leaders and escalation of conflicts. 
 
     Although most of the findings reflect a negative development in the attitude of 
the party governments toward the opposition parties, there are some positive indicators 
as well. For instance, the presence of threats in the speeches of the prime ministers 
decreases from the DP government to AKP government. Although it is found that 
threats were not considerably high in either of the cases, the findings on threats 
represent, at least, a positive development. The more significant positive development is 
the findings on the presence of pejorative words. The percentage of pejorative words in 
the speeches decreases in half from DP to AKP government. Even though the pejorative 
words are present in the discourses of the prime minister of the AKP governments, the 
decrease is promising regarding the quality of political discourse in Turkish politics. 
 
     Besides the negative and positive differences of these two party governments, 
there are some similarities as well. Both the DP and AKP governments reflect their 
most positive attitude toward the opposition parties during their first years. Then the 
frequency of negative behavior increases during the remaining years. This situation is 
interpreted as during the period of consolidation the party governments tried to be 
concordant with the other political actors, but after a while they behave more 
discordantly. However, it is significant to note that even during its most positive period, 
the AKP governments appear more negative toward the opposition than the DP 
governments.   
 
     To conclude, since most of the findings present an increase in negative attitudes, 
the results of this research do not support the claim that the long experience of multi-
party politics causes development of positive attitudes toward the opposition parties in 
the eyes of the governing parties and so do not support the first hypothesis. To the 
contrary, the contemporary government reflects more negative stance toward the 
opposition parties than the government in the beginning of the multi-party politics.  
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     The second hypothesis of this research was that coalition governments would be 
less negative toward opposition parties than the party governments. This hypothesis 
corresponds to the comparison of the coalition governments between 1995 and 2002 
with the party governments of DP and AKP. Since the coalition governments do not 
hold as strong majority in the assembly as the party governments do and they need the 
support of many actors in the politics, it was anticipated that the coalition governments 
would express more cooperative attitude toward the actors including the opposition 
parties. 
 
      Consequently, the findings support the expectation of the hypothesis as stated 
above. The percentage of negative sentences is at the lowest level when it is compared 
with the party governments. Contrary, almost half of the references of the prime 
ministers of the coalition governments are neutral or even positive toward the 
opposition parties. The results on the overall stance of the governments present that 
coalition governments are far less negative toward the opposition parties than party 
governments. This positive view is reflected on the issue categories as well. In both the 
domestic and external issues, the percentage of the negative sentences is lower than 
half. Furthermore, foreign policy issues, with a high percentage of positive interactions, 
reflect an area of cooperation between the ruling and opposition parties. 
 
      Although the percentage of individual interactions between the party leaders is 
almost equal with the numbers of party governments, the presence of negative 
interactions is less than the party governments’ results. More significantly, the 
pejorative words, which were considered as the most conflictual and negative way of 
interaction with the opposition parties, were not present in the sample of speeches of the 
coalition governments’ prime ministers. Also, the presence of threats, which was not 
high in the speeches of the party governments’ prime ministers as well, decreases 
further. These results suggest that aggressive ways of interaction, such as threats or 
pejorative references, become almost non-existent in the period of coalition 
governments and thus enhancing the government-opposition relations.  
 
Finally, regarding the future of the relations with the opposition parties, coalition 
governments reflect a much more positive position compared with the party 
governments. The results on party governments were also positive but the results on 
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coalition governments present that coalition governments provide better ground for the 
future of the government-opposition relations. 
 
     Yet there are some negative results on the coalition governments as well. First of 
all, the frequency of past references is higher in the period of coalition governments 
than the period party governments. Also, these past references of coalition 
governments’ prime ministers are as negative as the past references of the party 
governments. Besides, regarding the interests of the nation concept, the figures are not 
much more promising. Although the results on the national interests are more positive 
than the AKP government, they are more negative than the DP government. So, it could 
not be claimed that the coalition governments do not condemn the opposition parties for 
undermining the interests of the nation.  
 
     To conclude, although there are some negative results regarding the coalition 
governments, such as the high frequency of negative past references or the exploitation 
of the concept of the interests of the nation, most of the results like the non-existence of 
pejorative words or threats, less negative overall stance, and better interaction with the 
leaders of the opposition parties support the second hypothesis of this research. The 
coalition governments reflect a much more positive stance toward opposition parties 
when they are compared with the party governments of both the 1950s and 2000s. 
 
5.2  Conclusion 
 
     As a conclusion, this research had come up with two hypotheses to analyze the 
attitude of the governing parties toward the opposition parties starting with the multi-
party system in Turkish politics. The first hypothesis could not be justified with the 
empirical analyses of this research. When all of the results are considered, the AKP 
government in the 2000s reflects more negative attitude toward the opposition parties 
than the DP government in the 1950s. The second hypothesis of this research could not 
be falsified at the end. The coalition governments, within the limits of this research, 
reflect a more positive attitude toward the opposition parties than the party governments 
did. 
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     The investigation of coalition governments presents a relatively positive 
outcome on the relations between government and opposition parties. Regarding their 
low power in the National Assembly, it is considered that coalition governments present 
relatively positive and cooperative attitude toward the opposition parties since any 
opposition party of today has the potential of being a partner in the following cabinets.  
 
     However, the comparison of the DP and AKP party governments suggests that 
Turkish politics, after a long experience of multi-party system, seem to be problematic 
regarding the development of government-opposition relations. According to empirical 
observations of this research, both of the prime ministers of the party governments 
present a negative attitude toward the opposition parties. Prime ministers use pejorative 
words toward the opposition parties and condemn them for harming the interests of the 
nation. The exclusionist behaviors of the prime ministers do not provide hope for 
cooperation and conflict resolution processes between the governing and opposition 
parties. Rather, the negative discourse includes the danger of escalating the conflicts in 
the political sphere. Although the multi-party system survived for a long term, prime 
ministers seem to be having problems with the internalization of the existence of the 
opposition parties. The expectation that the long experience of multi-party politics 
would contribute to the development of less negative relations between governing and 
opposition parties did not prove to be true at the end of the research. Unless the political 
culture and/or structure, which were discussed in the second chapter, of Turkish politics 
change, it seems harder to expect better relations between the government and 
opposition parties and hard to expect constructive conflict resolution initiatives and 
consensus between the government and opposition parties. 
 
    As discussed before, there are several factors involved in this negative 
situation and several possible solutions for the problem. One of the suggestions for the 
solution is related to structural changes. Dahl argues that the typical solution of 
democracies is the dispersion, de-concentration of the power accumulated in the centre 
of the system.157 Under these circumstances unless the heavily centralized Turkish 
political system changes, the development of stable and constructive government-
opposition relations will probably remain to be difficult. Heper suggests that this 
                                                 
 
157 Dahl, R. A. (1965). op. cit., p. 7 
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structural change can happen over civil society. He claims that the democratic system in 
Turkey played a critical role in preventing a long-term hiatus in multi-party politics, but 
it has also prevented political parties from arriving at a consensus through conflict.158 
The political elite could not achieve sharing of power because the transition to 
democracy in Turkey was directed by the state elite, not by civil society.159 As long as 
the state elite keeps its power and lead the democratization process, the political elite 
will think that obtaining special privileges from the state is more desirable and feasible 
than resorting to joint action with other members of the political elite toward the 
center.160 According to this view, civilization of the politics and distributing the power 
concentrated in the center would normalize the relations between the actors of political 
elite. 
 
     Another suggestion is related to cultural rather than structural characteristics. As 
Frey suggests, dampening extremism and preventing the more puerile aspects of 
political culture could be a solution.161 Instead, values, roles, and patterns of behaviors 
that are associated with the growth of Western civilization should be developed.162 On 
this matter, Romano suggests to develop relations between Turkey and European 
Union.163 Besides, the Turkish political leaders should understand and acknowledge the 
significance of the political opposition for the benefit of the system. As Diamond 
claims, party leaders must take the lead to establish working relationships, manifest a 
faith in the democratic process and commitment to its rules that supersedes the pursuit 
of power or other substantive goals.164 Political leaders easily accept the view that 
political opposition is troublesome and dispensable, but they should recognize, just like 
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in the consolidated democracies, that political opposition is a crucial component of both 
the government of the day and of the people.165 
 
     All of these suggestions may have some contributions to the solution of the 
problem of internalization of the political opposition. If structural change meaning the 
de-concentration of the system, and cultural change meaning the adaptation of the 
democratic principles and transformation of political elite can be achieved, then the 
political opposition may become recognized as a regular actor of the politics. Then the 
conflictual relations between the government and opposition could be enhanced and 
democratic behaviors could develop further. After then peaceful solutions for political 
conflicts, and constructive communication between governing and opposition parties 
could be expected. 
 
5.3  Limitations and Recommendations for Further Studies 
 
     This research provided a comparison of the first and last examples of the party 
governments after 1950 in the Turkish politics. Also, a period of coalition governments 
is included to compare with the party governments. A period of almost 25 years of the 
multi-party system in the Turkish politics is included in this research. While collecting 
the data to avoid the bias of a newspaper, two different newspapers are used for each of 
the cases. In spite of these advantages, this research has some limitations as well. 
 
     First of all, the most significant limitation of this research is the lack of the 
analysis of the attitudes of the opposition parties toward the ruling parties. Although it is 
assumed by this research that the ruling parties are the determinants of the relation 
between the government and the opposition since they have the political power, the 
opposition parties’ and their leaders’ attitudes might have a contribution on the relation 
between governing and opposition parties. Although the governments have more 
opportunities to determine the nature of the relations, the opposition parties may 
provoke or soften the relations as well. Although Turan claims that it is the increasing 
authoritarian practices of the governments that drive the opposition parties to escalate 
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their competitive activities166, according to Eroğul, for the DP period, one of the reasons 
for A. Menderes to adopt wholly repressive tactics is the provocations of Đ. Đnönü.167 In 
this respect, a future study which focuses on the attitudes of the opposition parties 
toward the ruling parties, or both on ruling and opposition parties, may contribute to this 
research and to the field. 
 
 A further limitation is on the comparison between the party governments. This 
research presented that the experience of multi-party experience did not contribute to 
the internalization of the opposition parties since the frequency of negative attitudes are 
more in the AKP period than the DP period. Yet, on this comparison, there remains an 
unanswered question. The rising bitterness of the attitudes toward the opposition parties 
may present us that the experience of multi-party politics did not contribute to the 
recognition of the opposition parties. However, this situation may be arising from a 
difference between the DP and AKP. Basically, the DP was a split from the CHP and 
except their understanding on economic system, they did not deeply differ on other 
issues. The AKP, however, is a fraction of the Islamist National View (Milli Görüş) 
movement and includes more extremist dynamics than the DP had. The difference 
between these two parties may shadow the contribution of the experience of multi-party 
politics to the development of democracy.168 A future study focusing the idiosyncratic 
features of these parties could be contributing to the substance of this study. 
 
     Another limitation in this research is that the data are formed only from the 
speeches of the prime ministers of the corresponding time periods. Prime ministers are 
assumed to be the most influential person of the political parties. Although this 
assumption is mostly appropriate for the Turkish politics, other members or even the 
former leaders or members of the ruling parties might be influential on the discourse 
toward opposition parties. Thus, a research including all of the messages from the ruling 
parties toward the opposition parties could carry this research a step forward. 
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     Also, the data were only collected when the National Assembly was working. 
The recess periods of the parliament were excluded. For instance, the summer recess of 
1957 was the period of political campaigns for the upcoming national elections. Also, 
the summer recess of 2002 was also the period of political campaigns for the future 
national elections. These periods may include significant data regarding the questions of 
this research. From this point of view, further studies may consider including the recess 
periods of the TBMM as well. 
 
     Another limitation is that only one of the two newspapers assigned to each of the 
months to collect the data. Although it was emphasized that the discourse of the 
newspapers is not significant for this research, collecting speeches more than one 
newspaper could minimize the danger of bias further. So, any future research including 
more sources for the sampling would provide better grounds for generalizations. 
 
Finally, although a long period of Turkish political history with multi-party was 
system included, the period from 1960 to 1995 is excluded from this research. In this 
period, there are other examples of party and coalition governments. Regarding the 
large amount of data and scope of this research these examples were excluded. 
However, increasing the cases of both party and coalition governments would provide 
for more general findings. So, a further study focusing on the excluded cases of this 
research and providing a comparison with this research’s results might contribute to the 
field and to this research as well. 
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APPEDIX 1: LIST OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
Abbreviation Party ame 
ANAP Motherland Party 
AKP Justice and Development Party 
BBP Great Union Party 
BDP Peace and Democracy Party 
CHP Republican People’s Party 
CMP Republican Nation Party 
CMKP Republican Peasant’s Nation Party 
DEHAP Democratic People’s Party 
DP Democratic Party 
DSP Democratic Left Party 
*DTP Democratic Turkey Party 
**DTP Democratic Society Party 
FP Virtue Party 
GP Young Party 
HADEP People’s Democracy Party 
HP Liberty Party 
KP Peasant’s Party 
MHP Nationalist Movement Party 
MP Nation Party 
RP Welfare Party 
SP Felicity Party 
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APPEDIX 2: LIST OF THE GOVERMETS, PRIME MIISTERS, MAI 
OPPOSITIO PARTIES, MAI OPPOSITIO PARTY LEADERS AD 
OTHER OPPOSITIO PARTIES 
Government Prime 
minister 
Main 
Opposition 
Party 
Leader of 
the Main 
Opposition 
Party 
Other 
Opposition 
Parties 
DP 
(22.05.1950-
27.05.1960) 
Adnan 
Menderes 
CHP Đsmet Đnönü MP, CMP, 
CMKP, HP, KP 
ANAP-DYP 
(06.03.1996-
06.06.1996) 
Mesut Yılmaz RP Necmettin 
Erbakan 
DSP, CHP, 
MHP, HADEP 
and Others 
RP-DYP 
(28.06.1996-
21.06.1997) 
Necmettin 
Erbakan 
ANAP Mesut 
Yılmaz 
BBP, DSP, 
CHP, MHP, 
HADEP, DTP*, 
Others 
ANAP-DSP-
DTP* 
( 30.06.1997-
25.11.1998) 
Mesut Yılmaz RP (FP) Necmettin 
Erbakan 
(Recai 
Kutan) 
DYP, CHP, 
MHP, HADEP, 
others 
DSP 
(11.01.1999-
18.04.1999) 
Bülent Ecevit FP Recai Kutan ANAP, DYP, 
DSP, CHP, 
DTP*, Others 
DSP-MHP-
ANAP 
(28.05.1999-
03.11.2002) 
Bülent Ecevit FP (SP) Recai Kutan 
 
ANAP, DYP, 
CHP, HADEP, 
Others 
AKP 
(14.03.2003-
22.07.2007) 
R.Tayyip 
Erdoğan 
CHP Deniz 
Baykal 
DYP, MHP, 
GP, DEHAP, 
ANAP, SP, 
Others 
AKP 
(29.08.2007-
Present) 
R.Tayyip 
Erdoğan 
CHP Deniz 
Baykal 
(Kemal 
Kılıçdaroğlu) 
MHP, DP, GP, 
DTP**, BDP, 
Others 
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Appendix 3: QUESTIOS AD UIT OF AALYSIS 
Question Unit of Analysis 
#1 Sentence 
#2 Sentence 
#3 Sentence 
#4 Speech 
#5 Speech 
#6 Speech 
#7 Speech 
#8 Speech 
#9 Speech 
#10 Speech 
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APPEDIX 4: ISSUES AD CATEGORIES
169
 
 Internal Issues External 
Issues 
Economics Abstract 
Issues 
Democratic  
Party 
Political party 
closures, 
Events of 6-7 
September, 
National 
Elections,  
Freedom of the 
Press, Freedom 
of the 
Universities, 
Laicism, 
Kirsehir case, 
Real properties 
of CHP, 
Community 
Centers  
Military 
Intervention in 
Korea 
Budget, 
Economic aids, 
National debts 
Atatürk, 
Political Party 
Relations, 
Interests of the 
Nation, 
References to 
period of 
former 
governments, 
Development 
of Democracy, 
Democratic 
Values, 
Criticisms and 
offenses of the 
Opposition 
 
 
Coalition 
Governments 
National 
Elections, 
Election of the 
president of the 
Republic, 
Abolition of 
Death Penalty, 
Constitutional 
Changes, 
Internal 
Regulations of 
the TBMM, 
Political Party 
Closures 
Intervention in 
Afghanistan, 
European 
Union 
Budget,  
National Debts, 
Relations with 
IMF 
Political ethic, 
Democratic 
Values, 
Interests of the 
Nation, 
Political Party 
Relations, 
Principles of 
the Regime 
Justice and 
Development 
Party 
Constitutional 
changes, Local 
governance, 
Corruption, 
Political party 
closures, 
Cyprus, 
Kurdish 
Problem, The 
issue of 
immunity, The 
The agreement 
allow the U.S. 
to base troops 
in Turkey,  
European 
Union 
Privatizations, 
Budget, 
Relations 
 with IMF 
Political 
discourse, 
Criticisms and 
Offences of the 
Opposition 
parties, 
Interests of the 
Nation, 
Political ethic, 
Former 
governments, 
                                                 
169 This list only includes the cases that had been frequently discussed between the 
government and the opposition. Thus, it does not provide all of the agenda items of 
Turkish politics. 
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headscarf issue, 
Setting up own 
cadre in public 
offices, 
Election of the 
president of the 
Republic, 
National 
Elections 
Mentality of 
the Opposition 
 
 
 
APPEDIX 5
170
: PEJORATIVE WORDS 
 Democratic Party Justice and Development 
Party 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pejorative 
Words 
Kindar 
Đktidar Hastası 
Politika Hastası 
Şirret 
Zalim 
Đhtiyar 
Tezvirci 
Jurnalcı 
Kaypak 
Zorba 
Müstebid 
Çakal 
Müfteri 
Tedhişçi 
Sapık 
Nifakçı 
Çakal 
Hırsız 
Hastalıklı Ruh 
Siyaset Bezirganları 
Zavallı 
Yaygaracı 
Densiz 
Hafif 
Hazımsız 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
170 A category for coalition governments is not present since the researcher did not find 
a pejorative word toward the opposition in this period. 
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APPEDIX 6: THE ITERESTS OF THE ATIO 
Expressions Addressing the Interests of the ation 
Devlet Đtibarı 
Devlet Çıkarı 
Millet Đradesi 
Memleket Hayrı 
Memleket Menfaatleri 
Milli Birlik 
Milli Đrade 
Memleketin Yüksek Menfaatleri 
Vatanperver 
Memleketin Selameti 
Vatansever 
Memleketin Hayrı 
Gayri Milli 
Millet Đtibarı 
Milli Tesanüt  
Milletin Geleceği 
Ülkenin Geleceği 
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APPEDIX 7: THE RESULT OF ATIOAL ELECTIOS FOR THE DP 
PERIOD 
Party umber of Votes Percentage of Votes 
 1950 1954 1957 1950 1954 1957 
DP 4.241.393 5.151.550 4.372.621 52.68 57.61 47.88 
CHP 3.176.561 3.161.696 3.753.136 39.45 35.36 41.09 
MP 250.414 - - 3.11 - - 
CMP - 434.085 652.064  4.85 7.14 
TKP - 57.011 - - .64 - 
HP - - 350.597   3.84 
Independents 383.282 137.318 4.994 4.76 1.54 .05 
 
APPEDIX 8: RESULTS OF ATIOAL ELECTIOS FOR THE COALITIO 
GOVERMETS PERIOD 
Party umber of Votes Percentage of Votes 
 1995 1999 1995 1999 
RP (FP) 6.012.450 4.805.381 21.38 15.41 
AAP 5.527.288 4.122.929 19.65 13.22 
DYP 5.396.009 3.745.417 19.18 12.01 
DSP 4.118.025 6.919.670 14.64 22.19 
CHP 3.011.076 2.716.094 10.71 8.71 
MHP 2.301.343 5.606.583 8.18 17.98 
HADEP 1.171.623 1.482.196 4.17 4.75 
BBP - 456.353 - 1.46 
Independents 133.895 270.265 .48 .87 
Others 455.284 1.059.608 1.61 3.4 
 
APPEDIX 9: RESULTS OF ATIOAL ELECTIOS FOR THE AKP 
PERIOD 
Party umber of Votes Percentage of Votes 
 2002 2007 2002 2007 
AKP 10.848.704 16.327.291 34.43 46.58 
CHP 6.114.843 7.317.808 19.41 20.88 
DYP 3.004.949 - 9.54 - 
MHP 2.629.808 5.001.869 8.35 14.27 
GP 2.284.644 1.064.871 7.25 3.04 
DEHAP 1.933.680 - 6.14 - 
AAP 1.610.207 - 5.11 - 
SP 784.087 820.299 2.49 2.34 
DSP 383.609 - 1.22 - 
DP - 1.898.873 - 5.42 
Independents 302.801 1.864.971 .96 5.32 
Others 1.612.686 790377 5.12 2.27 
 
